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S

INCE the oil embargo of 1973, the international price of energy has
escalated dramatically, and a political and economic struggle has
developed in the United States over how to divide the profits generated
by spiraling energy prices. Producers, arguing the need for incentives
and capital to develop new energy sources, have sought to increase the
after-tax price of domestic energy. The government, arguing that
"windfall" energy profits should be spent in the public interest, has
levied or sought to levy higher taxes on energy. Consumers, arguing
against the burdensome and disruptive effects of higher energy costs,
have sought to lower or perpetuate current costs by supporting a variety of programs, including price regulation, innovative lifeline and inverted rate structures, and the installation of mandatory energy-conservation devices on cars, homes, and other energy-intensive consumer
goods. Within this maelstrom of conflicting interests, one issue that
raises a particularly significant problem of federalism is state taxation
of natural resource extraction.
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For many years, most western states have taxed the extraction of
natural resources. In the burst of energy development since 1973, many
of these states focused attention on the form and level of resource taxation.' The result has been either new taxes or higher tax rates. A few
examples are an increased tax rate on the severance of uranium in New
Mexico, 2 a new resource severance tax in Colorado, 3 a substantially

increased tax rate on coal in Montana,4 and even a per kilowatt tax on
the generation of electricity in New Mexico. 5
The rest of the nation frequently views these tax developments as
ill-disguised attempts by the resource-rich states to carve out larger
shares of the profits derived from resource extraction. These larger
shares are said to be unrelated to the costs the states incur from steppedup mining.6 The resource-producing states counter that mining depletes their physical wealth, imposes undesirable consequences on portions of their populations, and may foreclose other developmental alternatives. These states argue that natural resource taxation is an
appropriate way for them to obtain just compensation for the losses
that result from the extraction and removal of natural resources.
The federal-state conflict over resource taxation is an ever-escalating
one. The more the nation moves away from dependence on foreign
sources of oil, the more it intensifies its inward search for resources.
This search turns inevitably to the nonindustrialized, resource-rich
western states. The western states, in turn, raise their tax rates to cover
the higher externality costs associated with an accelerated rate of resource extraction and to prepare for the day when the resources will
be exhausted. Since the resource-producing states pass the increased
severance taxes on to the utilities and ultimately to consumers in sister
states, the resource-dependent states cry "little OPEC." The resourceproducing states respond with cries of "neocolonial exploitation." Although the extreme positions represented by these epithets can be re1 The term resource taxation, as used in this Article, includes the full panoply of
variously denominated state taxes levied on the severance or processing of natural
resources within the taxing state. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-25-4 (1978) (resources tax) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-25-5 (1978) (processors tax) ; N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 7-25-6 (1978) (service tax) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-26-1 (1978) (severance tax). This Article focuses on state taxation of the severance of natural
resources.
2 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-26-7 (1978).
3 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 39-29-101 to -114 (Supp. 1978).
4 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-35-101 to -110 (1978).
5 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-18-1 to -6 (1978). The Supreme Court invalidated this
statute in Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979). See generally
Note, The Effect and Validity of State Taxation of Energy Resources, 58 WASH.
U. L.Q. 345, 347-57 (1980).
6See, e.g., Boom in Strip Mining: Windfall for Montana, Washington Post,
May 22, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
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jected immediately, finding the actual dividing point between these
extremes calls for very difficult decisionmaking under the federal commerce clause.
The resource taxation debate raises numerous ironies. The coal company that firmly cited Carterv. Carter Coal Co. 7 for the proposition
that the states have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate "local" coal mining operations must try to forget that proposition when it attacks a
state severance tax on federal commerce clause grounds. The civil-rightsadvocate-turned-environmentalist, who scoffed at southern "states'
rights" and applauded Katzenbach v. McClung,8 must choke on Ollie's
Barbeque sauce when he invokes state sovereignty to support a state
severance tax enacted for environmental purposes. Likewise, the eastern
liberal critic of the laissez faire economics of the pre-New Deal Court
must now use that same Court's so-called free trade economics when
she attacks western state laws that raise the cost of energy in the East.
These shifts in ideological positions illustrate just how difficult the
federalism questions raised by modern resource development can be.
For example, does the existence of a state line around a natural resource
entitle the state to plan its future around the revenues that can be
generated from the resource? While a ghost town may represent the
ultimate in economic efficiency (when the resource is exhausted, the
population shifts to another location where there is sufficient demand
for employment), will our federal system tolerate ghost states ?
The decisions of the Supreme Court help to focus these issues. In the
view of Justice Frankfurter: "The interpenetrations of modern society
have not wiped out state lines. It is not for us to make inroads upon our
federal system either by indifference to its maintenance or excessive
regard for the unifying forces of modern technology." 9 The words of
Justice Jackson must also be reckoned with.
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce
by the certainty that he will have free access to every market
in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign
state will by customs duties or regula0
tions exclude them.'
The current debate over increased resource taxation tests these most
fundamental, if divergent, views of our federal union. It is clear that
states have the power to tax extractive activities as well as other industrial and manufacturing processes that occur within their borders." If,
U.S. 238 (1936).
8 379 U.S.294 (1964).
9 Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 650 (1944).
10 H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
11 See text accompanying notes 57-67 infra.
7298
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however, a state exercises that power in a fashion that virtually prohibits the flow of extracted resources to out-of-state markets,'1 2 the state
tax will violate the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable state
interference with interstate commerce) 3 The current challenge to Mon14
tana's coal severance tax in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State
frames the issue well. Out-of-state companies have challenged a tenfold
5
increase in the Montana tax, the highest severance tax in the nation.'
Resolution of Commonwealth Edison by the United States Supreme
Court will require at least a tentative striking of the commerce clause
balance between state interests in resource taxation and the federal
interest in the free flow of commerce.
This Article explores the modern commerce clause challenge to state
taxation of natural resource extraction. After briefly tracing the historical development of the commerce clause, it turns to the early resource taxation cases, which established that the extraction of natural
resources precedes commerce and is therefore shielded from commerce
clause scrutiny. Next, it discusses three categories of modern commerce
clause cases: state regulation cases, resource isolation cases, and state
taxation cases. The Article then proceeds to demonstrate that (1)
modern commerce clause developments have undercut the severanceprecedes-commerce formula of the old resource taxation cases, rendering state severance taxes vulnerable to commerce clause scrutiny, and
(2) the modern test for the constitutionality of state severance taxes
will require an inquiry into the amount of and reasons for the particular
tax. Finally, the Article discusses the specter of congressional preemption that now looms in the field of resource taxation, an area traditionally left to the exclusive control of state authority.
I
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution enumerates the
powers of Congress, one of which is the power "to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
12 See text accompanying notes 123-47 infra.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3; see text accompanying notes 16-25 infra.
14 37 Mont. St. Rep. 1192, 615 P.2d 847, prob. juris, noted, 101 S. Ct. 607 (1980)
(No. 80-581). The Montana Supreme Court upheld a dismissal of the out-of-state
companies' complaints for failure to state a cause of action. It held that the tax
was not levied on "an interstate activity" and therefore did not violate the commerce clause. Id. at 1201, 615 P.2d at 854. See generally Note, The Increasing
Conflict Between State Coal Severance Taxation and Federal Energy Policy, 57
13

TEx. L. Rnv. 675 (1979).
15 The tax is at approximately 30% of value.

(1978).

MONT.

CODE ANN. § 15-35-103
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Indian Tribes.'" The explicit congressional power "to regulate Commerce... among the several States," together with the negative implication that states may not invade that province, 1'7 sparks the debate in
commerce clause disputes. The debate always requires a resolution that
inherently affects the balance between state and federal power. Indeed,
the history of commerce clause adjudication is a history of the search
for that balance of federal-state power that best serves the society's
needs at a particular time, with the recognition that those needs continually change and become increasingly complex. The historical origin
of the clause itself provides only a small piece of the information necessary to understand how the clause applies to the complex political and
economic disputes that characterize the modern cases. However, any
attempt to suggest possible outcomes in commerce clause challenges
must necessarily begin with a review of the provision's origins.
The foremost problem of the federal union under the Articles of
Confederation may have been its inability to tax.1 8 The failure of the
Confederation may also be attributed, however, to the absence of national regulatory power over commerce, and to the resulting commercial "interstate brawls."'19 Trade barriers and acts of economic retribution among the states became so prevalent that in 1786 the Virginia
Assembly felt compelled to propose what became the Annapolis Convention "to take into consideration the trade of the United States [and]
to consider how far a uniform system in their commercial regulations may be necessary to their common interest and their permanent
harmony. ' 20 Although only five states sent representatives and nothing
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In a case of first impression, the Tenth Circuit
recently held that the commerce clause limits the powers of Indian tribes as well
as those of the states, and that "the standard to be used in applying [the Indian
commerce] clause is whether a tribe's tax legislation infringes upon the national
interest in maintaining the free flow of interstate trade.... measured by the traditional analyses." Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 545 (10th Cir.),
cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 71 (1980) (No. 80-11).
17 See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-2 (1978).
18 A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 108 (3d ed. 1963); S. MORISON, THE OxFoRD HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE

304 (1965).

19 "There were enough interstate brawls to cause great disquiet. The New York
assembly in 1787 assessed heavy entrance and clearance fees on all vessels coming
from or bound to New Jersey and Connecticut; New Jersey retaliated by taxing
the lighthouse on Sandy Hook £30 a month." S. MORISON, supra note 18, at 304.
See generally Sholley, The Negative Implication of the Commerce Clause, 3 U.
CHI. L. REV. 556 (1936) ; Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1946).
20 Resolution of the General Assembly of Virginia, Proposing a Joint Meeting
of Commissioners from the States to Consider and Recommend a Federal Plan
for Regulating Commerce (Jan. 21, 1786), reprinted in GOVERNMENT PRINTING
OFFICE, DOCUMENTS

ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION

AMERICAN STATES 38 (1927)

[hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTS].
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substantive resulted, the report of the Annapolis Convention was one
catalyst for the Constitutional Convention of 1787.21 The records of
the Constitutional Convention, 22 the Federalist Papers, 23 and the histories of the period 24 all indicate that the framers of the Constitution
sought to overcome interstate rivalries and parochial protection of local
economic interests. It is this purpose that modern Supreme Court
opinions continue to describe as the original intent of the commerce
clause.

25

Because the framers clearly intended to free national commerce from
the strictures of state protectionism when they gave Congress the power
"t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States, ' 26 it is curious
21 It was . . . to secure freedom of trade, to break down the barriers to

its free flow, that the Annapolis Convention was called, only to adjourn
with a view to Philadelphia. Thus the generating source of the Constitution lay in the rising volume of restraints upon commerce which
the Confederation could not check. These were the proximate cause of
our national existence down to today.
W. RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH 25 (1947).
While the Annapolis Convention was primarily concerned with removing barriers to commerce, the participants clearly recognized that this problem was linked
with other aspects of the federal system.
In this persuasion, your Commissioners submit an opinion, that
the Idea of extending the powers of their Deputies, to other objects,
than those of Commerce, which has been adopted by the State of New
Jersey, was an improvement on the original plan, and will deserve to
be incorporated into that of a future Convention; they are the more
naturally led to this conclusion, as in the course of their reflections on
the subject, they have been induced to think, that the power of regulating trade is of such comprehensive extent, and will enter so far into the
general System of the federal government, that to give it efficacy, and
to obviate questions and doubts concerning its precise nature and limits,
may require a correspondent adjustment of other parts of the Federal
System.
Proceedings of the Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal Government,
Annapolis, Maryland (Sept. 14, 1786), reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 20,
at 39, 41-42.
22 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 308
(rev. ed. 1937) ; 3 id. at 478, 547-48. See generally S. PADOVER, To SECURE THESE
BLESSINGS 215-19 (1962).
23 THE FEDERALIST Nos. 7, 11-12 (A. Hamilton), 41-42 (J. Madison).
24 1 G. CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOPTION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 502 (1854) ; M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 5-10 (1913) ; 1 F. THORPE, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 266-75 (1901).
25
See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979) ; Exxon Corp.
v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 151 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ; Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794,
807 (1976) ; Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The purpose of the commerce clause is similar
to that of the import-export clause, which provides: "No State shall, without the
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that they did not expressly address state interference with interstate
commerce.27 The Convention, however, was pervaded by a fundamental
division between delegates who advocated a strong central government
and those committed to state sovereignty as the primary principle of
union.2 8 An attempt to fashion language on state interference with interstate commerce could easily have led to a breakup of the Convention.
The need to skirt that issue in order to reach consensus on the Constitution as a whole2 9 may be the best explanation for the silence in the
commerce clause concerning the limitations on state power to regulate
3 0
commerce.
Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports .
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.2. The import-export clause was intended, among
other purposes, to prevent seaboard states from discriminating against inland
states by taxing overseas imports and exports. 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 22, at
328-29; see Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976). This purpose
of nondiscrimination is common to both clauses.
But unlike the commerce clause, the import-export clause is a limitation on
state power, not an affirmative grant of power to Congress. See L. TRIBE, supra
note 17, §§ 6-2, -21. It has been construed as an absolute prohibition of state taxation of imports and exports. Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329
U.S. 69, 76 (1946). In modern import-export cases, however, the Court is moving
towards a balancing approach similar to that used in the modern commerce clause
cases. The Court in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976), reconsidered the purposes of the clause, id. at 285-90, including the purpose of preserving harmony among the states by preventing discrimination by seaboard states
against inland states. Id. at 285. It then concluded that a nondiscriminatory ad
valorem property tax on imported goods did not frustrate those purposes. Id. at
293-94.
Expanding the analysis of Michelin Tire, the Court in Department of Revenue
v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978), applied commerce
clause analysis, specifically the four-pronged test of Complete Auto Transit, Inc.

v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) ; see text accompanying notes 163-65 infra, to a tax
on imports and exports. 435 U.S. at 761. Two years later, in Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449-50 n.14 (1979), the Court elaborated
on the similar purposes of the two clauses and again stated that under the importexport clause, a state tax on imports and exports must satisfy the same test for
nondiscrimination as that required under the commerce clause.
27 It has been suggested that the framers may have believed that the privileges
and immunities clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, was a sufficient limitation on state
parochialism. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-2.
28 See generally A. KELLY & W. HARDISON, spra note 18, at 114-47.
29
As Alfred North Whitehead remarked: "The [framers] had an uncommonly
clear grasp of the general ideas that they wanted put in here, then left the
working out of the details to later interpreters ...... THE DIALOGUES OF ALFRED
NORTH WHITEHEAD 204 (L. Price ed. 1954).
30 An early commerce clause scholar suggests that the framers knew they could
not grasp all the implications of the grant of the commerce power; therefore, they
were unwilling to impose a categorical limitation on state action, preferring to
leave such limitations to a fair application of the congressional power. F. RIBBLE,
STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OVER COMmERcE 30 (1937).
Justice Jackson read the commerce clause silence as placing an affirmative duty
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In any case, the framers' silence soon gave way to the strong federalist declarations of Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden.3' In
striking down a steamboat license monopoly granted by the New York
legislature, the chief justice found that the state charter conflicted with
a federal coastal licensing law. The federal licensing law was upheld as a
valid exercise of the commerce power. Chief Justice Marshall then
concluded that the conflicting state license violated the supremacy
clause.32 The decision established the foundation for the theory of the
exclusivity of federal power over commerceAu
on the Court to promote the economic best interest of the country. "[Elven more
than by interpretation of its written word, this Court has advanced the solidarity
and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning it has given to these great silences
of the Constitution." H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
It is not clear, however, that the commerce clause must be read as embracing a
constitutionally compelled doctrine of national free trade. See note 33 infra.
3122 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
32 Id. at 221.
33 Chief Justice Marshall's opinion was not without ambiguity concerning
whether the commerce power was exclusively federal.
The acknowledged power of a State to regulate its police, its domestic
trade, and to govern its own citizens, may enable it to legislate on this
subject, to a considerable extent ....
Since, however, in exercising the power of regulating their own
purely internal affairs, whether of trading or police, the States may
sometimes enact laws, the validity of which depends on their interfering
with, and being contrary to, an act of Congress passed in pursuance of
the constitution, the Court will enter upon the inquiry, whether the laws
of New York ... have ... come into collision with an act of Congress
....Should this collision exist, it will be immaterial whether those laws
were passed in virtue of a concurrent power [to regulate commerce] or,
in virtue of a power to regulate their domestic trade and police.
Id. at 208-10. Professor (later Justice) Frankfurter attributed the confusion in
the Marshall opinion to the chief justice's desire to move cautiously in cementing
his federalist doctrine.
Marshall's use of the commerce clause greatly furthered the idea that
though we are a federation of states we are also a nation, and gave
momentum to the doctrine that state authority must be subject to such
limitations as the Court finds it necessary to apply for the protection of
the national community.
F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE
18-19 (W. Mendelson ed. 1973).
The ambivalence remains over whether the negative implication of the commerce clause is principally a device that helps to allocate the balance of state and
federal power or whether it embodies the principle of national free trade. Unresolved by Chief Justice Marshall, this debate was perhaps most classically
framed by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson. See text accompanying notes 9-10
supra. Not surprisingly, this same debate sharply divides the present Court. Compare Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 (1980) (5-4 decision) (Blackmun,
J.) ("Restraint in this area is also counseled by considerations of state sovereign-
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If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress,
though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those
objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely
as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the
3 4 power as are
found in the constitution of the United States.
Owing perhaps to the natural law tradition underlying the early development of American constitutional law,3 5 post-Gibbons commerce
clause adjudication was marked by repeated but unsuccessful attempts
to discover fundamental principles that could rationally and fairly be
applied to all state regulations affecting interstate commerce. One such
attempt was Brown v. Maryland.36 Brown held that the commerce

clause precluded Maryland from licensing wholesalers of imported
goods when those goods remained in their original packages and still
belonged to the importer.3 7 Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the
Court, attempted to set out a principled distinction. "The power to
direct the removal of gunpowder is a branch of the police power, which
38
Nuunquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the States.
merous early commerce clause opinions seized on Marshall's distinction
between regulations of interstate commerce and legitimate exercises of
the states' "police power."

' 39

ty [and] the role of each State 'as guardian and trustee for its people'...."), with
id. at 443 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Commerce Clause long has been recognized as a limitation on [state] sovereignty, consciously designed to maintain a
national market and defeat economic provincialism.").
34 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 197. In a concurring opinion, Justice Johnson came
to the issue more directly. He would have held that, irrespective of the federal law,
the New York license was invalid as an invasion of the power left exclusively to
Congress. "The inferences, to be correctly drawn, from this whole article, appear
to me to be altogether in favour of the exclusive grants to Congress of power over
commerce.... Id. at 236.
35 See F. RIBBLE, supra note 30, at 8-19. See generally Corwin, The "Higher
Law" Background of American ConstitutionalLaw, 42 HARv. L. REV. 149 (1928) ;
Harper, Natural Law in American Constitutional Theory, 26 MIcH. L. REV. 62
(1927).
36 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 262 (1827).
37 Id. at 267. The doctrine that precluded states from licensing or taxing foreign imports left in their original packages became known as the "original package" doctrine. It was weakened by later cases holding that when the imports
are part of an inventory used to meet daily manufacturing needs, they become
subject to state taxation, even though still in their original packages. E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959). The Supreme Court
expressly disavowed the original package doctrine in Michelin Tire Corp. v.
Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 282-83 (1976).
38 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 269.
39 L. TIBE,supranote 17, § 6-3, at 323; see, e.g., Mayor of New York v. Miln,
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) (state requirement that masters of out-of-state
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Cooley v. Board of Wardens40 was the next commerce clause milestone. The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Curtis, 41 upheld
a local requirement that interstate ships engage local pilots when entering and leaving the port of Philadelphia. The Court drew a distinction between those "subjects ... imperatively demanding a single
uniform rule" and those "as imperatively demanding that diversity,
which alone can meet . . . local necessities. ' 42 In the Court's view,
the pilot regulation fell in the latter category and therefore passed
commerce clause muster. In the following decades, the Court employed
the Cooley doctrine to allow states to regulate aspects of commerce that
were "local" in nature, while leaving to Congress the regulation of
"national" aspects of commerce that required uniform rules. 43
The distinction between "national" and "local" subjects began to
give way in the late nineteenth century, just as the distinction between
"regulation of commerce" and "police power" previously had proved
inadequate to resolve interstate commerce disputes. The development
of more sophisticated commercial relationships required the Court to
look beyond the subject of a state regulation to examine the effect of the
regulation on the flow of commerce. 44 This focus on the regulation's
impact on commerce led to the development of still another rubric for
commerce clause analysis, which permitted state regulations to burden
vessels supply passenger lists was not a regulation of commerce but an exercise
of police power). It has also been suggested that Marshall's opinion in Wilson v.
Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (upholding Delaware's
right to drain a marshy portion of a potential interstate waterway), implies that
the Delaware statute fell "outside the ban of the 'dormant' commerce clause, because it [was] not a regulation of commerce, but of 'police.'" F. FRANKFURTER,
supranote 33, at 29.
It should be understood that this commerce clause test was applied in an era
when economic relationships had not yet become so complex that a piece of legislation could have the effect of regulating commerce even though its purpose was
clearly "police" in nature. Id. at 30.
40 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
41 Chief Justice Taney, a member of the Cooley majority and Marshall's successor in 1836, advocated a different approach to the commerce clause than his
predecessor. Taney believed that the commerce clause did not itself limit the
exercise of state power. He saw the clause only as a grant of authority to Congress. In his view, the Court's role was to overrule state statutes only when necessitated by a direct conflict with an act of Congress. F. FRANKFURTER, supra note
33, at 50-51; see License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 579 (1847).
42 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319.
43 In Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886), the Court
struck down state regulation of railroad rates for interstate goods, even though
there was no conflicting federal law. Fearing that the "cumulative burden" of such
rates enacted by several states would be too disruptive of commerce (not unlike
the state trade barriers of the Confederation, see note 19 supra), the Court decided
that the area required national uniformity.
44 L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-4, at 325.
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commerce "only indirectly, incidentally, and remotely." 45 State regulations deemed so substantial as to constitute "direct" burdens on inter46
state commerce were struck down.
Each of these three successive tests, which evolved during the first
century of commerce clause litigation, 47 has been criticized as "overly
conclusory and misleadingly precise" 48 because it masked "the analysis
underlying the decisions in which [it] played a role."' 49 Yet these tests
remain important in modern commerce clause litigation both because
they embody fundamental principles that still apply 50 and because the
45 Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 482 (1888).
In the most famous of the
Grange Cases, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), which upheld state regulation of grain elevators, the Court applied the Cooley doctrine with overtones of the
direct-versus-indirect formula. "[U]ntil Congress acts in reference to their interstate relations, the State may exercise all the powers of government over them, even
though in so doing it may indirectly operate upon commerce outside its immediate
jurisdiction." Id. at 135.
46 E.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917).
47 The foregoing discussion has focused on the Court's attempts to define the
permissible scope of state regulation during the century after Gibbons. Overlapping
this doctrinal development was a general decline in the federal commerce power
during the early twentieth century. Until the New Deal shift in the Court in 1937,
the Court imposed its view of laissez faire economics to preclude federal legislation aimed at solving various social and economic problems caused by the American industrial revolution. See F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 33, at 115-17. One of
the Court's rationalizations for its refusal to extend congressional power was
that certain aspects of production precede the flow of goods in commerce. See, e.g.,
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (manufacturing is not
commerce). It was during this period that the Court decided that the act of severing resources is not commerce. See text accompanying notes 52-62 infra. Because
the narrow judicial view of the federal commerce power that prevailed during this
period has been thoroughly repudiated by the post-1937 Court, those early severance tax cases are of questionable validity. See text accompanying notes 215-32
infra.
48 L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-5, at 326.
49 Id. § 6-4, at 324.
50 For example, the cumulative burden principle applied in modern state taxation cases clearly has its roots in the Cooley distinction between local subjects and
subjects requiring national uniformity. This principle recognizes that when several states impose the same tax on an interstate business, the resulting cumulative
burdens may prohibit a state tax that, viewed in isolation, does not unduly burden
commerce. E.g., Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255-56
(1938).
Similarly, the modern resource isolation cases stem from the Gibbons principle
that the federal commerce authority must be exclusive in order to prevent state
trade barriers. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) ; Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Furthermore, the modern balancing test of
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), preserves the distinction between indirect and direct burdens on commerce. Pike includes as an element of its
test an inquiry into whether a statute's "effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental." Id. at 142.
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modern Court will occasionally slip behind the comfortable obfuscation
51
of one of these mechanical tests to reach a desired result.
II
THE Heisler TRILOGY

Any attempt to apply the commerce clause to modern resource taxation problems must take into account that many of the cases directly
concerning resource taxation were decided before the New Deal. Dur52
ing the 1920's, a period of judicially supported laissez faire economics,
the Supreme Court decided a series of significant resource taxation
cases known as the Heisler trilogy. 5s In all three cases, corporate taxpayers challenged state resource taxes on commerce clause grounds,
arguing that the taxes both posed undue burdens on and discriminated
against interstate commerce. In each case, the Supreme Court rejected
these arguments. It concluded that the tax was applied to the act of
severance or production, which preceded the flow of commerce and
54
therefore was not subject to commerce clause constraints.
5
5
The issue in Heisler v. Thonazs Colliery Co. was framed by facts
that track the modern problem. The challenged tax was levied on, a type
of anthracite coal found only in a few counties of Pennsylvania. The
uniqueness of the coal put the state in a potentially monopolistic bargaining position.56 Eighty percent of all the anthracite produced was
shipped to states where the coal was a necessity because of local laws
that prohibited the use of more prevalent coal of higher sulphur content.
51 The debate between the majority and the dissenting justice in Exxon Corp.
v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978), is illustrative. In upholding a Maryland
law that required oil producers and refiners to divest themselves of retail operations in the state, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, reasoned: "The fact
that the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not,
by itself, establish a claim of discrimination .... " Id. at 126. In dissent, Justice
Blacknun argued that the law was discriminatory. He pointed out that "the burden
[was] significant [and fell] on the most numerous and effective group of out of
state competitors."Id. at 148 (emphasis added). This debate is but one modern
application of the old distinction between direct (Blackmun) and indirect (Stevens) burdens on commerce. It seems no less conclusory now than it did when first
enunciated.
52 See note 47 supra.
53 Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927) ; Oliver Iron Mining
Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923) ; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245
(1922).
54 "Mining is not interstate commerce, but, like manufacturing, is a local business subject to local regulation and taxation." Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord,
262 U.S. 172, 178 (1923).
55 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
56 The coal was taxed at only one and one-half percent of its value when prepared for market. Id. at 253.
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These facts parallel the present demand for western coal and uranium.
The taxpayer in Heisler advanced the commerce clause argument
that "a tax upon [anthracite coal] is levying a tribute upon the consumption of other States." 57 The Court expressed concern, however,
that if the mere fact that a product was destined for shipment out of
state were held to place the product in interstate commerce, states would
not be able to tax any commercial activities within their borders. 5s For
this reason, it held that a tax levied when coal has been mined and is
ready for shipment precedes the time at which the coal is "governed and
protected by the national law of commercial regulation." 59
Heisler was followed by Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord,60 which
held that mining is not interstate commerce. In the third case in the
trilogy, Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall,(" the Court treated as settled
Id. at 258.
58 If the possibility, or, indeed, certainty of exportation of a product or
57

article from a State determines it to be in interstate commerce before
the commencement of its movement from the State, it would seem to
follow that it is in such commerce from the instant of its growth or
production, and in the case of coals, as they lie in the ground. The result
would be curious. It would nationalize all industries, it would nationalize
and withdraw from state jurisdiction and deliver to federal commercial
control the fruits of California and the South, the wheat of the West and
its meats, the cotton of the South, the shoes of Massachusetts and the
woolen industries of other States, at the very inception of their production or growth, that is, the fruits unpicked, the cotton and wheat ungathered, hides and flesh of cattle yet "on the hoof," wool yet unshorn,
and coal yet unmined, because they are in varying percentages destined
for and surely to be exported to States other than those of their
production.
Id. at 259-60.
59Id. at 260-61 (quoting Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 525 (1886)). Coe held
that the commerce clause did not prohibit a New Hampshire town from taxing
logs drawn down a New Hampshire river and stored in the town for later shipment to Maine. Like the Court in Heisler, the Coe Court could see no limit to the
taxpayer's commerce clause argument.
It seems to us untenable to hold that a crop or a herd is exempt from
taxation merely because it is, by its owner, intended for exportation.
If such were the rule in many States there would be nothing but the
lands and real estate to bear the taxes. Some of the Western States
produce very little except wheat and corn, most of which is intended
for export; and so of cotton in the Southern States. Certainly, as long
as these products are on the lands which produce them, they are part of
the general property of the State. And so we think they continue to be
until they have entered upon their final journey for leaving the State
and going into another State.
116 U.S. at 527-28.
60 262 U.S. 172 (1923). Practically all the ore mined was shipped out of state.
There was also clear continuity of movement out of the state once the ore was
severed.
61274 U.S. 284 (1927). At issue was a West Virginia privilege tax on production of natural gas, measured by the value of the gas at the wellhead.
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doctrine the principle that a privilege or occupation tax on the mining
or production of resources does not violate the commerce clause. This
early distinction between "local business" and "the flow of interstate
commerce" has insulated state resource taxation from successful com62
merce clause challenge to the present day.
Later cases gave renewed support to the result of the Heisler trilogy.
In Michigan-WisconsinPipe Line Co. v. Calvert,6 the Court suggested
in dictum that the commerce clause does not prevent states from taxing
resource extraction. It went on to hold, however, that the state had
delayed the incidence of the tax until production had ceased and transmission in commerce had begun, rendering the tax invalid. 64 In Alaska
v. Arctic Maid,65 the Court reaffirmed the distinction between taxes on
local activities and taxes on the flow of commerce. It upheld Alaska's
four percent tax on fish taken by out-of-state freezer ships for immediate transportation to out-of-state canneries. Harking back to the Heisler
trilogy, the Court held that the event taxed was the local business of
taking fish. 66 In 1969 the Court again relied on the notion that certain
activities precede commerce when it sustained an Alabama tax on
photographers who engage in the "local activity" of taking pictures in
Alabama.

67

The Heisler trilogy, although not yet applied by the modern Court to
a state severance tax, has been bolstered by the subsequent support of
62 For example, in Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932), the
Court relied heavily on Oliver Iron Mining Co. and Hope Natural Gas Co. to
conclude that the generation of electricity was sufficiently distinct from its transmission to justify a state tax on generation.
We are satisfied, upon a consideration of the whole case, that the process
of generation is as essentially local as though electrical energy were a
physical thing; and to that situation we must apply, as controlling, the
general rule that commerce does not begin until manufacture is finished,
and hence the commerce clause of the Constitution does not prevent the
state from exercising exclusive control over the manufacture.
Id. at 181. See also Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S.
604 (1938) (tax on production of mechanical power for interstate pipeline held a
valid local privilege tax).
63 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
64 Id. at 167-68. In so holding, the Court once more distinguished "processing"
and "production" from "transmission in interstate commerce." Id. at 167.
65
366 U.S. 199 (1961).
66 The Oliver Iron case is indeed a first cousin of the present case. Here,
as there, the tax is an occupation tax. Here, as there, the market for the
product obtained locally is interstate, the taking being a step in a process
leading to an interstate market. In both the local product is promptly
loaded for interstate shipment. But in each there is a preliminary local
business being conducted-an occupation made up of a series of local
activities which the State can constitutionally reach.

Id. at 204.
67

Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc. v. Alabama, 393 U.S. 537, 541 (1969).
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Michigan-WisconsinPipe Line, Arctic Maid, and numerous state court
cases. 68 While the Heisler trilogy and its modern progeny appear to
present a firm and fixed principle of commerce clause adjudication, the
undercurrents of change are much in evidence. First, there has been a
general shift by the Court away from formalistic commerce clause tests
towards a balancing approach that allows for the accommodation of
competing interests. 69 Second, the Court consistently has required state
laws that effectively isolate natural resources from the national economy to meet a stricter commerce clause test than other state laws.70
Finally, there has been an erosion of the doctrinal view that precluded
states from fairly taxing the flow of commerce. 71 All these trends sug68 See, e.g., Industrial Uranium Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 95 Ariz. 130, 387
P.2d 1013 (1963) (upholding Arizona's transaction privilege tax on the gross
proceeds or gross income from mining) ; California Co. v. State, 141 Colo. 288,
348 P.2d 382 (1959) (graduated excise tax on gross income derived from the extraction or production of crude oil and natural gas located within the state) ; Bel
Oil Corp. v. Roland, 242 La. 498, 137 So. 2d 308 (1962) (severance tax on natural
gas) ; Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Haden, 200 S.E. 2d 848 (W. Va. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974) (tax on the generation of electricity). In each of these
cases, the state court applied the reasoning of the Heisler trilogy to uphold the
challenged tax, characterizing it as a tax on a local business activity that preceded the flow of interstate commerce. This severance-precedes-commerce analysis
also underlies the Montana Supreme Court's opinion in Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. State, 37 Mont. St. Rep. 1192, 615 P.2d 847, prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct.
607 (1980) (No. 80-581). See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
The three most recent state supreme court decisions on resource taxation focus
on discrimination against out-of-state consumers through disparate tax credits
given to in-state taxpayers. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. O'Chesky, 91 N.M. 485,
576 P.2d 291 (1978) (upholding New Mexico tax on the generation of electricity),
rev'd sub non. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979) ; Post Oak
Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 575 P.2d 964 (Okla. 1978) (upholding conservation excise tax on gas produced in Oklahoma) ; Public Util. Dist. No. 2 v.
State, 82 Wash. 2d 232, 510 P.2d 206, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973) (upholding Washington tax on the generation of electricity).
In Arizona Public Service, the United States Supreme Court struck down the
New Mexico electrical energy tax as discriminatory and in contravention of a
federal statute. 441 U.S. at 146-50. This federal statute, however, was not in
effect when the Washington Supreme Court upheld Washington's power generation tax against similar discrimination claims in Public Utility District No. 2.
The Court in Arizona Public Service expressly refused to determine the validity of
the Washington tax. Id. at 150 n.7.
In Post Oak, the Oklahoma conservation excise tax faced a similar discrimination challenge, as well as an argument that the tax unduly burdened commerce.
To answer the latter argument, the Oklahoma Supreme Court resorted to an
Oliver Iron solution. The court held that the tax was on the local act of severance
and production and that it imposed only an incidental burden on interstate commerce. 575 P2d at 968. For a commerce clause analysis of the Oklahoma tax, see
Note, supra note 5, at 348, 353-54.
69 See text accompanying notes 76-122 infra.
70 See text accompanying notes 123-47 infra.
71 See text accompanying notes 148-214 infra.
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gest that the Heisler trilogy's simple distinction between activities "in"
commerce and those "out of" commerce will be insufficient to resolve
modern severance taxation cases.
III
THE MODERN COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS

The modern commerce clause decisions7 2 recognize that the clause
requires a complex "reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state and
national power" that can only be accomplished through a careful "appraisal and accommodation of the competing demands of the state and
national interests."7 3 They also recognize that, in the absence of congressional action, 74 the Court is the final arbiter of these competing
interests and, concomitantly, it is the Court that must intervene when
necessary to carry out the framers' intent to protect our national
75
economy.
This section of the Article explores three categories of commerce
clause cases that illustrate the principles likely to govern modern severance taxation questions. The state regulation cases demonstrate the
factors the Court considers when it balances state regulatory interests
against burdens on interstate commerce. The resource isolation cases
suggest that the balancing approach may give way to per se invalidity
when the state statute smacks of trade barrierism. Finally, the balancing
approach first developed in the state regulation cases is shown to have
found its way into the modern state taxation cases and thus to have
undercut the Heisler line of cases.
A. The State Regulation Cases
The modern commerce clause balancing test is most clearly articu6

7
lated in Pike v. Bruce Church,Inc.

Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is
72 The modern era of commerce clause adjudication began with the 1937 shift in
the Court.See note 47 supra.

73 Southern Pac. Co.v.Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1945).
74 For a discussion of the possibilities for congressional preemption of state
severance taxes, see text accompanying notes 254-88 infra.
75 See F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 33, at 21-22. Later, the then Justice Frankfurter wrote: "The task of scrutinizing is a task of drawing lines. This is the
historic duty of the Court so long as Congress does not undertake to make specific
arrangements between the National Government and the States in regard to revenues from interstate commerce." Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1946).
76 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend
on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.Y
Pre-Pike decisions often failed to formulate a test, and post-Pike decisions invariably begin their analyses with the Pike formulation. Each of
the commerce clause regulation cases in which the Court used a balancing approach can be explained by some or all of the components of the
Pike test: (1) evenhandedness, (2) legitimacy of the local public interest, (3) burden imposed on commerce in relation to local benefit,
78
and (4) least intrusive means.
1. Evenhandedness
The evenhandedness component of the Pike test focuses on whether
the legislation discriminates against interstate commerce. 79 While the
cases do not require absolute equality of treatment of interstate and
intrastate commerce, if the Court finds discrimination,"0 it will scrutinize the state legislation more closely and require the state to offer
greater justification for the statute. 8' Indeed, in cases that involve
77 Id. at 142 (citation omitted). Pike invalidated a state statute that required
Arizona cantaloupes to be packed in the state. The Court suggested, however,
that state regulations that affect public health or safety might be subjected to a
lesser standard of scrutiny. Id. at 143-44.
78 Most recently, the Court has restated the Pike test as a three-pronged test:
Under [the] general rule we must inquire (1) whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with only "incidental" effects on
interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce
either on its face or in practical effect; (2) whether the statute serves
a legitimate local purpose; and if so, (3) whether alternative means
could promote this local purpose as well without discriminating against
interstate commerce.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
79 Although Pike states the test for discrimination separately from that for
burden, the two tests often employ the same balancing approach. This approach
analyzes the state objective, the purpose behind that objective, and the means
chosen to achieve the particular end. For a recent articulation of the discrimination and burden components of Pike as a single test, see note 78 supra.
80 Theoretically, a finding of discrimination against interstate commerce may
be overcome by the absence of less restrictive means to protect a legitimate state
interest, but no decision fully applies that analysis. In fact, a finding of discrimination usually sounds the death knell of a state statute challenged on commerce
clause grounds. When the Court upholds a statute, it often resorts to formalistic
tests in order to avoid pronouncing the statute discriminatory. See, e.g., Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (Maryland's prohibition against
oil producers or refiners operating retail service stations burdened commerce only
incidentally; therefore it was not discriminatory).
81 The evenhandedness requirement of Pike parallels the nondiscrimination
requirement of the privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
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facial discrimination similar to a trade barrier,8 2 the lack of evenhandedness triggers an almost per se rule of invalidity.83 A facially discriminatory statute that encourages retaliation by sister states 4 or requires
action by a sister state to make its application evenhanded" will also
receive close scrutiny. Even when the statute is evenhanded on its face,
the Court will examine the practical effect of the statutory scheme to
determine whether it is discriminatory in operation. When the effect is
clearly discriminatory and without substantial justification, the statute
will fall. 8 6
2. Legitimacy of the Local Public Interest
As a legacy of the old distinction between "police power" and "regulation of commerce,"8 the modern cases focus on the nature of the
local interest protected. To the extent that these cases maintain the old
distinction, they can be viewed as presenting a hierarchy of local interests.8 8 The more legitimate the local interest, the less judicial scrutiny
the Court seems to require.
At the bottom of the hierarchy, a state's attempts to regulate its
The privileges and immunities clause insures to citizens of each state the same
rights of state citizenship held by citizens of any other state into which they
venture. It prohibits a state from discriminating against nonresidents when "there
is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are
citizens of other States." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) ;see Hicklin
v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978). The Court has allowed preferential treatment of
residents over nonresidents only when it is supported by a valid reason that bears
a close relationship to the degree of discrimination. One example of a legitimate
reason for preferential treatment is the protection of wildlife. Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
82 The difficulty of overcoming clear and demonstrable discrimination is well
illustrated by the milk regulation cases. See, e.g., Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co.
v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964) (attempt to reserve local market for local milk
held invalid discrimination against interstate commerce) ; Dean Milk Co. v. City
of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (invalidating a requirement that milk sold in
the city be pasteurized within five miles of city) ;Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U.S. 511 (1935) (striking down a prohibition against in-state resale of milk
purchased outside the state at prices below state minimum).
83 See text accompanying notes 123-47 infra.
84 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) ; Public
Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
85 See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
86 E.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977) (North Carolina restriction on the labeling of apples shipped into state
discriminated against the interstate sale of Washington apples).
Although one might also expect that a law discriminatory on its face but evenhanded in operation will pass constitutional muster, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322 (1979), suggests that this is not the case. "Such facial discrimination
by itself may be a fatal defect, regardless of the State's purpose .
Id. at 337.
87 See text accompanying notes 40-46 supra.
88 See generally L. TRiam, supra note 17, §§ 6-6 to -8, 6-12.
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economic well-being border on per se illegitimacy.8 9 If the purpose90 or
predominant effect 91 of a regulation is to protect local markets from
interstate competition, the regulation is clearly suspect. Somewhat
higher in the hierarchy is a state's interest in the safety of its citizens.
In the train and truck regulation cases, the Court gave safety regulations a strong presumption of validity when they conflicted with the
commerce clause. 92 At the top of the hierarchy, state regulation of
public health receives the greatest deference from the Court. The quarantine cases, in which the Court upheld statutes prohibiting the importation of diseased cattle or decayed or noxious food,93 are the clearest
example of the Court's deference to state health regulations despite
94
direct and substantial impacts on commerce.
As the interest protected by the regulation moves from the economic
sphere towards public safety and health, it becomes more likely that the
statute will withstand commerce clause attack. Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice9" establishes, however, that the mere recitation
of a health or safety purpose will not suffice; the regulation must actually further the interest asserted. In that case, the Court struck down a
state-imposed truck-length limitation because the state had failed to
produce evidence to counter the plaintiff's massive evidence that the law
did not contribute to highway safety. 96 Furthermore, City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey shows that even when the state's health or safety
aims are genuine, the statutory means selected to achieve the desired
89 But see notes 98-102 and accompanying text infra.

90 See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); FosterFountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
91 See. e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333 (1977).
92 See Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 393
U.S. 129 (1968) ; South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177
(1938).
93 Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933) (unhealthy cattle) ; Price v. Illinois,
238 U.S. 446 (1915) (food preservative) ; Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908)
(unhealthy cattle) ; Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U.S. 189 (1904) (adulterated
foods).
94 Although these cases have been rationalized on the theory that the prohibited
products were "not proper subjects of commerce," Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U.S. 511, 525 (1935), they are more fairly understood as balancing cases in
which the states' interest in prohibiting noxious products reasonably outweighed
the interference with commerce. L. TpaBE, supra note 17, at 28 n.43 (Supp. 1979).
95 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
96 The Court clearly understood that safety, like other legitimate state interests,
must be weighed against interference with interstate commerce. Id. at 443. It has
been suggested, however, that if safety justifications are supported by the factual
record, "the Court will not second-guess legislative judgment about their importance in comparison with related burdens on interstate commerce." Id. at 449
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ; see notes 110-14 and accompanying text infra.

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Volume 60, 1981]

result may also be a factor to balance. 97
Finally, the mere fact that a regulation touches on economic matters
will not automatically invalidate it. Conserving natural resources, 98
controlling agricultural production,99 and maintaining environmental
quality' 00 all have been recognized as legitimate legislative purposes.' 0 '
Indeed, most recently, the Court has suggested in dictum that the legitimate purposes of state regulation may even include protecting the state's
economic well-being; the state may legitimately ensure a steady supply
of milk, create jobs, preserve its financial resources, or otherwise "protect its residents' pocketbooks.'

10 2

Thus, although the modern Court sometimes has maintained the
traditional economics-safety-health hierarchy of state interests, not all
its decisions fit within this hierarchy. The Court has acknowledged that
the complexities of modern state government require a broader range
of legitimate state regulation than the traditional areas of safety and
health. At the same time, however, it has recognized an expanding
national interest in the free flow of commerce, against which the states'
legitimate interests must be weighed. 0 3
3. Burden on Commerce in Relation to Local Benefit
The third component of the Pike test asks whether "the burden imposed on .

.

. commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative

local benefits."'10

4

This balancing of state and federal interests has been

97 See 437 U.S. 617, 625 (1978). "If reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available," even unquestioned health concerns must give way. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340
U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
98 See Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
99 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
100 See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
101 In each of the cases cited in notes 98-99 supra, however, the Court engaged
in substantial balancing of state and federal interests.
102 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978). The Court
has also recognized that a state may legitimately control its retail gasoline market
by requiring out-of-state producers to divest themselves of retail businesses within
the state. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 125 (1978). Furthermore, the state may enter the interstate market as a proprietary participant in commerce and avoid the commerce clause limitations that would apply to it in its
regulatory and taxing capacity. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980)
(state as producer of cement may favor state residents) ; Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (state may favor in-state dealers over out-ofstate dealers when it purchases junk cars converted into scrap).
103 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 110-14 infra.
104 397 U.S. at 142. Pike seems to suggest that the balancing of burden and
local benefit will take place only if the statute's "effects on interstate commerce
are . . . incidental." Id. This reversion to the old direct-versus-indirect formula,
see notes 44-46 and accompanying text supra, plays little part in modern commerce clause analysis. As a practical matter, statutes found to withstand the Pike
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a constant theme in commerce clause adjudication. 0 5 For example, in
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,108 the Court used a balancing approach to strike down an Illinois requirement that trucks have contour
mudguards. Because contour mudguards were not measurably safer
than the straight ones allowed in forty-five other states, the showing of
added safety was insufficient to outweigh the burden on interstate commerce. 10 7 In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,0 s marginal safety interests were similarly balanced against heavy burdens on commerce, resulting in the invalidation of Arizona's train-length limitation. 09
In contrast with Bibb and Southern Pacific, some Supreme Court
decisions' 0 have suggested that health and safety considerations should
not be balanced against mere economic loss; instead, the Court should
defer to the state legislatures' weighing of these considerations against
balancing test are also found to have an incidental effect on commerce, see, e.g.,
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978), and those that fail
the test are found to have a substantial or direct effect on commerce. See, e.g.,
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
105 It has been suggested that the Cooley test is essentially a balancing of state
and federal interests, although "conducted under the guise of 'classifying' the state
interest" as local or national. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-12, at 341.
106 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
107 The burden included the cost of installing the contour mudguards ($30 or
more per vehicle) as well as the delay caused by changing mudguards. Id. at 525,

527.
108

325 U.S. 761 (1945).

109 The Arizona train-length limitation was deemed to afford "at most slight

and dubious advantage, if any, over unregulated train lengths." Id. at 779. Against
this were balanced the facts that (1) over 90% of the rail traffic affected was
interstate, id. at 770; (2) the limitation was enforced in only two states, id. at 774;
and (3) it would cost carriers about $1,000,000 per year to comply. Id. at 772.
110 In Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 393
U.S. 129 (1968), the Court invoked a traditional rational relationship test to uphold a statute requiring full crews on railroad lines within the state. In deferring
to the state legislative judgment that public safety required full crews, the Court
commented that "[ilt is difficult at best to say that financial losses should be balanced against the loss of lives and limbs of workers and people using the highways."
Id. at 140.
Similarly, in South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177
(1938), the Court upheld a truck size and weight limitation, inquiring only sufficiently to assure itself that the regulation had some rational basis. The Court
brushed aside the fact that approximately 90% of interstate trucks exceeded the
limitation, noting that the regulation's coverage of intrastate as well as interstate
carriers was "a safeguard against [its] abuse." Id. at 187.
According to Professor Tribe, the rationale underlying the safeguard-againstabuse notion in Barnwell is that nondiscriminatory regulations are less likely
to offend the commerce clause "when the interests adversely affected have been
adequately represented in the regulating state's own political process." L. TRIBE,
supra note 17, § 6-5, at 327. See also Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,
767-68 n.2 (1945).
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the attendant burdens on commerce.' The recent decision in Raymond
Motor Transportation,Inc. v. Rice" 2 rejected this view, however.
While conceding that great deference was due to the state legislative
judgments behind health and safety regulations, the Court in Raymond
Motor ultimately accepted the balancing approach: "[W]e cannot
accept the State's contention that the inquiry under the Commerce
Clause is ended without a weighing of the asserted safety purpose
against the degree of interference with interstate commerce." 113 Thus,
even when the state purpose is legitimate and proper deference is given
to the legislative judgment, the Court will nevertheless weigh the
4
competing federal interests."

4. Least Intrusive Means
Even if a particular regulation furthers a legitimate local purpose,
the Pike test will not permit it to burden commerce when the purpose
"could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.""' 5 This least-intrusive-means requirement traditionally has been
applied to state regulations that serve a legitimate state purpose but are
discriminatory on their face or in effect." 6 Even the most compelling
and legitimate local purpose will not save a discriminatory regulation
unless there are no "reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives" available that are "adequate to conserve" the local interest. 1 7 Thus, the
111 Some lower courts have adopted this view. See, e.g., American Can Co. v.
Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973) (upholding the Oregon bottle deposit law).
112 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
113 Id. at 443. But see id. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
114 A further consideration under this prong of the Pike test is whether the
challenged state regulation must actually burden interstate business or whether
a potential for burden is sufficient to trigger invalidation. The early cases suggested that a potential for burden is sufficient, but those cases arose in a civil
rights context. See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) ; Hall v. DeCuir, 95
U.S. 485 (1878). Their use of a potential-for-conflict rationale to strike down
state-imposed racial segregation on interstate trains before the rise of equal protection analysis may not be representative of solid commerce clause analysis. A
more recent case has suggested that mere potential for conflict is not enough. See
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448 (1960).
115 397 U.S. at 142. The Court first clearly articulated a least-intrusive-means
test in Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). The Pike
formula incorporated essentially the same test.
116 See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977) ; Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). In Hughes
v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), the Court restated this prong of the Pike
test expressly in terms of discrimination: "whether alternative means could promote this local purpose as well without discriminating against interstate commerce." Id. at 336.
117 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
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least-intrusive-means test applies a rigid bottom line to an otherwise
flexible standard.
In Hughes v. Oklahoma,118 an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the
interstate sale of Oklahoma minnows was challenged on commerce
clause grounds. 1 9 After finding that the law facially discriminated
against interstate commerce, 120 the Court unequivocally stated: "At a
minimum such facial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of
any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives."' 121 The Court's language strongly implies
that the least-intrusive-means requirement of Pike is, like the strict
scrutiny standard found in the equal protection cases, virtually impossible to overcome.' 22 The difficulty for the state is compounded by the
fact that Hughes's "strictest scrutiny" goes not just to the offending
regulation, but to the entire spectrum of possibly less intrusive regulations.
The essential lesson from the regulation cases is twofold. First, to
118 441 U.S. 322 (1979).

119 Hughes expressly overruled Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), which
had held that because the state "owned" the wild game within its borders, the state's
control over the game was outside the scope of the commerce clause. 441 U.S. at
335; see Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. at 530-32. By overruling Geer, Hughes
removed the only barrier to commerce clause scrutiny of the Oklahoma statute.
120 "It forbids the transportation of natural minnows out of the State for
purposes of sale, and thus 'overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at [the]
State's borders.'" 441 U.S. at 336-37 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
121 Id. at 337. Applying this strict scrutiny, the Court held the statute repugnant
to the commerce clause because "Oklahoma ha[d] chosen to 'conserve' its minnows
in the way that most overtly discriminate[d] against interstate commerce." Id. at
338.
122 The strict scrutiny standard of the equal protection cases has been criticized
as a result-oriented label that virtually seals the fate of the challenged regulation.
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). "[Tlhere are very few cases which strictly scrutinize and yet
uphold instances of impaired fundamental rights." L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 16-6,
at 1000.
As recently put by Justice Blackmun:
I have never been able fully to appreciate just what a "compelling
state interest" is. If it means "convincingly controlling," or "incapable
of being overcome" upon any balancing process, then, of course, the test
merely announces an inevitable result, and the test is no test at all. And,
for me, "least drastic means" is a slippery slope and also the signal of
the result the Court has chosen to reach. A judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less "drastic"
or a little less "restrictive" in almost any situation, and thereby enable
himself to vote to strike legislation down.
Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89
(1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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survive a commerce clause challenge, a state regulation' must either be
nondiscriminatory or be the least discriminatory means of achieving an
important state objective. Second, even if nondiscriminatory, the regulation must be judged by balancing the importance of the state interest
it serves against the burden it imposes on interstate commerce. The
Court's efforts in the state regulation cases to accommodate both state
and federal interests through a balancing test are a far cry from the
mechanical severance-precedes-commerce test applied in Heisler. As
will be seen below, the resource isolation cases further erode the Heisler
trilogy.
B. The Resource Isolation Cases
The Supreme Court has characterized certain state regulations as
placing the state "in a position of economic isolation"'12 that effectuates
economic protectionism 124 or tends towards "economic Balkanization.'12 5 Such a characterization leads to the inescapable conclusion
that the particular regulation erects precisely the kind of barrier that
the commerce clause was designed to prohibit. 2 6 The Court consistently
has used this analysis in cases that involve the isolation of a state's
natural resources from interstate business and consumers in sister
127
states.
In an early resource isolation case, West v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co.,' 2 s the Court was confronted with an Oklahoma statute that in

effect prohibited the shipment of natural gas outside the state. The
Court struck down the statute as purposeful discrimination against
interstate commerce. 129 In doing so, it rejected the argument that the
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935).
H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
125 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) ; see Friedman, Hardy &
Wuliger, Balkanization of Interstate Energy Markets: New Variations of Sovereign Self-Interest, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 291 (1980).
126 E.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) ; Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) ; see text accompanying notes 18-30 supra.
127 Similarly, the Court has invalidated an attempt by Mississippi to withhold
its markets from producers in a sister state that did not provide reciprocal rights
to Mississippi producers. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366
(1976). The Mississippi regulation was invalid because it invited " 'a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of the very purpose of the Commerce
Clause.'" Id. at 380 (quoting Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356
(1951)). Relying on the free trade concept that underlies the commerce clause, id.
at 380; see text accompanying notes 18-25 supra, the Court reasoned that the
commerce clause precludes "the threat of economic isolation as a weapon to force
sister states to enter into even a desirable reciprocity agreement." 424 U.S. at 379.
128 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
129 Id. at 262. The Court relied on the logic of State ex rel. Corwin v. Indiana
& Ohio Oil, Gas & Mining Co., 120 Ind. 575, 22 N.E. 778 (1889), an Indiana case
that had invalidated a similar law. The Corwin court had reasoned as follows:
123
124
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state had the right to reserve its resources for the use of its citizens. 130
Similarly, when West Virginia sought to prevent natural gas pipeline
companies from shipping natural gas out of the state until all local
needs were met, the Court in Pennsylvaniav. West Virginia'31 held that
the commerce clause prohibited the state's "attempt to regulate the interstate business to the advantage of the local consumers.' 32 The Court
in these early cases did not reject conservation of natural resources as
a legitimate state end, 3 3 but it did preclude the use of trade barriers as
legitimate means to that end.
These resource isolation cases can be analyzed under the least-intrusive-means component of the Pike test. 3 4 First, they present classic
examples of state regulations that discriminate against interstate commerce. 135 Second, although these regulations may serve legitimate local
purposes, 1 36 they do so without regard to less discriminatory alternatives.1 . 7 Indeed, they impose the ultimate burden on interstate commerce by preventing certain resources from ever entering interstate
commerce. For this reason, the balancing component of the Pike test
(1) when brought to the surface and put in pipes, natural gas is a "commercial
product" that can be transported, bought, and sold; (2) if natural gas can be kept
in a state, so can all other commercial products such as corn, wheat, lead, and iron,
which would result in the " 'annihilation of interstate commerce'"; and (3) therefore, the statute prohibiting shipment out of state violates the commerce clause.
221 U.S. at 256 (quoting Corwin, 120 Ind. at 578, 22 N.E. at 779).
130 Id. at 250.
131 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
132 Id. at 597-98. "A State is without power to prevent privately owned articles
of trade from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the ground that they
are required to satisfy local demands or because they are needed by the people of
the State." Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928). In addition to regulations that favor local customers, those whose purpose or effect is to
favor local producers have been invalidated on commerce clause grounds. E.g.,
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) ; H.P.
Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1948); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385 (1948).
133 The modern cases, of course, specifically recognize "the States' interests in
conservation . . . as legitimate local purposes similar to the States' interests in
protecting the health and safety of their citizens." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 337 (1979). Nondiscriminatory regulations aimed at conservation will therefore survive commerce clause scrutiny. In Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil
& Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950), the Supreme Court let stand a state-imposed
increase in oil wellhead prices as a valid measure to discourage the wasting of
gas. The Court concluded that "[ilnsofar as conservation is concerned, the national interest and the interest of producing states may well tend to coincide." Id.
at 187-88.
34
1 See text accompanying notes 115-22 supra.
135 See text accompanying notes 79-86 supra.
136 See text accompanying notes 87-103 supra.
7
13 See text accompanying notes 115-22 supra.
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does not apply; once the Court finds the evil of resource isolationism,
the statute almost inevitably falls.
This analysis appears most clearly in City of Philadelphiav. New
Jersey.l3 s There, the Court invalidated a New Jersey law that sought
to protect the state's diminishing sanitary land fills by banning the importation of garbage. Rather than focusing on the article of commerce
(the garbage), the Court looked to the scarce natural resource (New
Jersey's land fill). 3 After characterizing the landfill as a resource, the
Court easily found the "evil of protectionism' 140 in the statute that precluded interstate access to the resource.' 4' The Court then applied "a
virtually per se rule of invalidity."'1 42 More recently, in Hughes v.
Oklahoma,143 the Court again demonstrated that if trade barrierism or
resource isolationism is found, the Pike balancing test does not apply.
Hughes makes clear that the Court will apply "the strictest scrutiny"
44
when it finds resource isolationism.1
138

437 U.S. 617 (1978).

139 Id. at 628.
140 Id. at 626.
It is interesting to note that in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980), the
Court sidestepped the resource isolationism argument. "Cement is not a natural
resource, like coal, timber, wild game, or minerals. It is the end product of a complex process whereby a costly physical plant and human labor act on raw materials." Id. at 443-44 (citations omitted). This distinction was challenged by
Justice Powell in dissent.
The Court's distinction fails in two respects. First, the principles articulated in the natural resources cases also have been applied in decisions
involving agricultural production, notably milk processing. More fundamentally, the Court's definition of cement production describes all
sophisticated economic activity, including the exploitation of natural
resources. The extraction of natural gas, for example, could hardly
occur except through a "complex process whereby a costly physical
plant and human labor act on raw materials."
Id. at 449 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The result in Reeves
suggests that the evil of resource isolationism can best be avoided by labeling the
product at issue as something other than a "resource."
141 Consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to reach the Pike balancing
test. "This dispute about ultimate legislative purpose need not be resolved, because
its resolution would not be relevant to the constitutional issue to be decided in this
case." 437 U.S. at 626.
142 Id. at 624, 628.

143 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
Id. at 337; see text accompanying notes 118-22 supra. The evil of resource
isolationism is that it discriminates against interstate commerce by preventing
certain resources from entering commerce. See text accompanying notes 134-37
supra. Justice Rehnquist takes the view, however, that such discrimination does
not violate the commerce clause unless it favors in-state business over out-of-state
business, "no matter how 'Balkanized' the resulting pattern of commercial activity." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 342-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He
thus rejects the strict scrutiny standard in resource isolation cases and would
144
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The resource isolation cases undercut the application of the Heisler
trilogy to modern resource taxation problems. State taxation may be
viewed as a form of state regulation that can isolate state resources.145
If a severance tax is so high that it actually precludes or hinders access
to the needed resource, the specter of resource isolationism and its
attendant discrimination dearly is raised. 146 Consequently, the tax may
trigger the strict scrutiny test of Hughes or the per se rule of City of
Philadelphia.147 As modern severance tax rates continue to rise, the
Heisler trilogy becomes less likely to shield them from charges of resource isolationism.
C. The State Taxation of Commerce Cases
The decisions governing state taxation of commerce are the quiet
revolution in current constitutional adjudication. Recent Supreme
Court rulings in Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington
Stevedoring Cos.,1 48 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,1 49 and

Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages'5 0 have rewritten the ground rules in
this field. A brief review of the previous law is necessary to understand
5
these decisions.1 '

One early touchstone of commerce clause adjudication was the principle that the privilege of doing interstate business could not be subject
to state taxation. The Court began with the notion that the commerce
clause prevented a state from entirely barring an out-of-state corporation from doing interstate business within the state. 152 It then extended
simply apply the Pike balancing test to weigh the governmental interest involved
against the degree of the burden on commerce. Id. at 343. See also Hellerstein,
Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce Clause, and State Control of
NaturalResources, 1979 Sup. CT. Rxv. 51.
145 "[A] tax might be explained in terms of its regulatory impact, as license
taxes sometimes are. Taxes thus justified raise the same issues as do state regulations and are therefore judged by the [same] standards." L. TRIBE, supra note 17,
§ 6-14, at 346.
with the aim and effect of establishing an economic
146 State taxes "used ...
barrier" clearly suffer from the same constitutional infirmity as trade barrier
regulations. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935).
147 Given the result-oriented nature of a strict scrutiny standard, see note 122
supra, the difference between the strict scrutiny approach articulated in Hughes
and the per se approach of City of Philadelphia may have little or no practical
significance. Perhaps it is not unlike the difference between an irrebuttable presumption (City of Philadelphia) and a presumption rebuttable in law but in fact
insurmountable (Hughes).
148 435 U.S. 734 (1978).
149 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
150 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
151 The brief review that follows is a distillation of the review found in Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court: Toward a More Unified Approach
to Constitutional Adjudication, 75 MIcH. L. REv. 1426, 1442-45 (1977).
152 Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877).
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the principle to bar a tax imposed on a foreign corporation as a condition to doing business within a state. 153 From there it took only a small
step to prohibit taxes levied on the privilege of conducting interstate
54
business.
Early in the development of the privilege doctrine, the Court began
to sidestep the doctrine by labeling certain aspects of business (such as
the manufacture of goods, 155 the mining or severance of mineral resources, 156 and the generation of power 157 ) as "local incidents" of interstate business. These "local incidents" were taxable because they "preceded" interstate commerce and therefore were not subject to commerce clause limitations. In applying the privilege doctrine, the Court
commonly looked to whether a particular tax was levied on local incidents of interstate business or on the privilege of conducting interstate
business.
The Court soon became caught in an illusory search for a principled
way to make this distinction. In Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor,15s it struck down a corporate tax on net income received within
the state. As applied to a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in
interstate commerce, the tax amounted to a tax on the privilege of doing interstate business and thus violated the commerce clause. 159 In
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,1 60 however,
the Court upheld taxes identical in their economic effects to the tax at
issue in Spector Motor, stating that these taxes were not privilege
taxes. 16 ' This formalistic application of the privilege doctrine virtually
determined the validity of a particular tax according to the name the
state legislature gave it.
153

162

See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1 (1910).

154 See, e.g., Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389

(1952) ; Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925).
'55 E.g., American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919) ; United States
v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
156 E.g., Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922) ; see text accompanying notes 55-62 supra.
157 Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932).
158 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
159 Id. at 609.
160 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
161 Id. at 462.
162 Compare Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954)
(tax on "privilege of doing business" held invalid), with Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959) (upholding the same tax relabeled as a
"franchise tax"). The formalistic focus on the legislative labeling of a tax rather
than its economic effect reached its highwater mark in Colonial Pipeline, Inc. v.
Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975). The Court in Colonial Pipeline upheld a tax on
the privilege of doing interstate business in corporate form, while at the same
time it reaffirmed the Spector Motor holding that a tax on the privilege of doing
interstate business itself violated the commerce clause. Indeed, Colonial Pipeline
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The break from the privilege doctrine came in Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady.'63 Complete Auto overruled the Spector Motor test and
stated that the Court had "moved toward a standard of permissibility
of state taxation based upon its actual effect rather than its legal terminology.' 1 64 In upholding a Mississippi tax on the "privilege of doing
interstate business," the Court enunciated a four-pronged, functional
test: a state tax does not violate the commerce clause when it "[ 11 is
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2]
is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.' u65
had successfully challenged an earlier state tax on the privilege of doing business.
Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morton, 228 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 1969), review
denied, 255 La. 474, 231 So. 2d 393 (1970). The Louisiana legislature then changed
the words "'the privilege of carrying on or doing business'" to " '[t]he qualification to carry on or do business in this state or the actual doing of business within
this state in a corporate form.'" 421 U.S. at 103 (quoting Act of July 13, 1970,
ch. 325, § 1, 1970 La. Acts 856 (amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:601 (1970))).
When this second form of the statute was challenged, it was upheld. 421 U.S. at
109-14.
163
164

430 U.S.274 (1977).
Id. at 281.

165 Id. at 279. The replacement of the formalistic approach with the practicaleffect doctrine of Complete Auto was foreshadowed by the Court's decision in
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976). In Michelin Tire, the Court
disavowed the century-old, mechanistic "original package" doctrine, see note 37
supra, and held that the import-export clause did not bar a state from imposing
a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on imported goods. 423 U.S. at
282-83. In doing so, the Court applied the following practical analysis:
To be sure, allowance of nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxation may increase the cost of goods purchased by "inland" consumers.
But as already noted, such taxation is the quid pro quo for benefits
actually conferred by the taxing State. There is no reason why local
taxpayers should subsidize the services used by the importer; ultimate
consumers should pay for such services as police and fire protection
accorded the goods just as much as they should pay transportation costs
associated with those goods. An evil to be prevented by the ImportExport Clause was the levying of taxes which could only be imposed
because of the peculiar geographical situation of certain States that
enabled them to single out goods destined for other States. In effect,
the Clause was fashioned to prevent the imposition of exactions which
were no more than transit fees on the privilege of moving through a
State. A nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax obviously stands on
a different footing, and to the extent there is any conflict whatsoever
with this purpose of the Clause, it may be secured merely by prohibiting the assessment of even nondiscriminatory property taxes on goods
which are merely in transit through the State when the tax is assessed.
Id. at 288-90 (footnotes omitted). The Court in Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 755 (1978), held that a nondiscriminatory tax on gross receipts from the stevedoring of goods in transit
would not be invalid under the import-export clause.
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The Complete Auto test was reaffirmed the following year in Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos.166
Reversing earlier stevedoring cases, 167 Washington Stevedoring held
that "taxing the interstate commerce activity of stevedoring" does not
necessarily violate the commerce clause.168 Rather, "[t]he Commerce
Clause balance tips against the tax only when it unfairly burdens commerce by exacting more than a just share from the interstate activity."' 6 9
It is, then, the functional test of Complete Auto that now governs state
taxation of interstate commerce. 1 70 Each of the test's four elements
must be examined in light of earlier Supreme Court cases in order to
understand the consequences of applying the test to severance taxation.
1. SubstantialNexus with the State
The requirement of substantial nexus, or "minimum contacts," between the state and the activity taxed is as much a due process limitation on jurisdiction as it is a requirement of the commerce clause. 1' 1 In
17 2
addition to the notions of fairness embodied in the due process clause,
the nexus requirement demanded by current commerce clause doctrine
serves two important purposes. 17 3 First, it ensures that the tax will have
some impact on local as well as interstate interests. Local impact guarantees that the political restraints of a state's legislative process will
come into play. 17 4 Second, the nexus requirement reduces the risk that
the tax will place an undue cumulative burden on interstate commerce. 1 75 The more directly the tax is connected with local activities
U.S. 734 (1978).
Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947) ; Puget
Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937).
168 435 U.S. at 749-50. The Court also applied Michelin Tire to uphold the
tax against an import-export clause attack. Id. at 759-61.
169 Id. at 748. When it applied the four elements of the Complete Auto test,
the Court found "no factual basis on which to declare the Washington tax unconstitutional." Id. at 751.
170 See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
171 Compare National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753
(1967) (use tax invalidly applied because minimum contacts requirement of
commerce clause not met), with American Oil Co. v. Neil, 380 U.S. 451 (1965)
(sales tax invalid because the state lacked minimum contacts required by due
process).
172 See, e.g., International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
173 See L. TRIE, supra note 17, §§ 6-14 to -15.
166 435
167

174 "Lying back of these decisions is the recognized danger that, to the extent
that the burden falls on economic interests without the state, it is not likely to
be alleviated by those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely interests within the state." McGoldrick v. BerwindWhite Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45 n.2 (1940).
175 The main evil of cumulative burdens on commerce is that they discriminate
against interstate commerce and thus erect barriers to interstate trade. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 256 (1938). Generally, the
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and events, the less likely it is that other states will impose the same
77
tax ;176 consequently, there is less risk of cumulative tax burdens.
2. FairApportionment
The fair apportionment requirement is aimed primarily at preventing the cumulative taxation of interstate commerce. To meet this requirement, the taxing state must set its tax on an interstate business
according to a formula that fairly determines the fraction of the total
business that takes place within the taxing state. As formulated by the
Court, the fair apportionment requirement asks whether "what the State
is exacting is a constitutionally fair demand by the State for that aspect
178
of the interstate commerce to which the State bears a special relation.'
Thus, the fair apportionment doctrine addresses some of the same considerations of fairness, free trade, and multiple burden as the nexus
requirement. 1 79 One significant difference, however, is that this element
taxpayer must prove that a cumulative burden actually exists. General Motors
Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964). At least one Supreme Court decision
has indicated, however, that proof of a clear potential for an extreme cumulative
burden is sufficient to invalidate a state tax. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759 (1967) ("For if Illinois can impose
such burdens, so can any other State, and so, indeed, can ... every other political
subdivision throughout the Nation with power to impose sales and use taxes.").
176 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 260 (1938). Interestingly, one offshoot of the reasoning of the Heisler trilogy is the notion that
because the act of severance precedes movement in interstate commerce, resource
severance taxes do not lend themselves to multiple application.
177 The strong local nexus of certain fixed-fee taxes has been sufficient to
justify them as providing reasonable compensation for benefits conferred, despite
their capability of multiple application. E.g., Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport
Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972) (tax of $1.00 per passenger
levied on airlines using state airports was sufficiently related to benefit).
178 Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 661 (1948). The
formula "must bear a rational relationship, both on its face and in its application,
to . . .values connected with the taxing State." Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri
State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 325 (1968) (formula's reliance on track mileage
led to demonstrably inflated tax).
Although the fair apportionment principle in theory prevents the repeated
taxation of the same local incident, the use of diverse formulae by different states
leads to overlapping tax liabilities. See L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-19. The Court's
efforts to avoid such cumulative burdens have resulted in the requirement that an
apportionment formula include more than one measure of business activity. The
net income tax upheld in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,
358 U.S. 450, 453-54 (1959), involved three measures of business activity: sales,
total tangible property, and payroll. But see Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S.
267 (1978).
The Court has also suggested that unusual formulae may be subject to closer
scrutiny to ensure that multiple burdens are avoided. General Motors Corp. v.
District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553, 559-60 (1965) ; see L. TRIBE, supra note 17,
§ 6-19.
179 Professor Tribe properly points out that fair apportionment does not allevi-
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of the Complete Auto test addresses the amount of the tax as distinguished from the power or right of the state to impose the tax.
3. Nondiscrimination
In order to prevent balkanization of the states, the commerce clause
has been used consistently to strike down state taxes that unreasonably
benefit local commerce at the expense of interstate commerce. Taxes
that unjustifiably encourage the conduct of business operations within
the taxing state 1s0 and those that exempt in-state activities or persons
without sufficient justification 81 are but two examples of the kinds of
discrimination against interstate commerce that the commerce clause
prohibits. Furthermore, as in the state regulation cases,18 2 the discrimination need not be facial. The Court will probe to uncover discrimi83
natory effects of seemingly neutral statutes. Competitive disadvantage to out-of-state businesses is the principal
84
concern of the nondiscrimination aspect of the Complete Auto test.
The inability of out-of-state merchants and consumers to participate in
local tax decisions, however, provides another reason for commerce
clause protection from discriminatory barriers designed to protect local
business. 8 5 Nevertheless, the mere fact that the impact of the tax may
be passed on to out-of-state users of the ultimate product does not con8 6

stitute discrimination.1

ate the "tollgatism" created by taxes that merely capitalize on a strategic trade
route. L. TRIBE, supranote 17, § 6-18, at 365 n.16.
180 Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977). The
tax under attack, which encouraged the selling of stocks in New York, was
markedly similar to the law in Pike, which encouraged the boxing of cantaloupes
in Arizona. Id. at 335-36.
181 Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 (1939). The electrical energy
tax in Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979), was similarly invalidated because of an unjustifiable local exemption, although the case was ultimately decided on federal preemption grounds.
182 See text accompanying note 86 supra.
183 See, e.g., Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940). Alaska v. Arctic
Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961), suggests that in the case of a facially discriminatory
statute, the Court will look for a nondiscriminatory effect. But see Arizona Pub.
Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
184 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 498 (1887)
(solicitation fee operated to disadvantage of out-of-state businesses).
185 The Court in Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946), struck
down a local solicitation license tax because of its discriminatory and exclusionary effects. "Provincial interests and local political power are at their maximum weight in bringing about acceptance of this type of legislation. With the
forces behind it, this is the very kind of barrier the commerce clause was put in
the fundamental law to guard against." Id. at 434.
186 See, e.g., Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922); Coe v.
Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
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4. FairRelationship to Services
The Complete Auto requirement that the tax be "fairly related to
the services provided by the State"''1 7 has its origins in earlier nexus
cases.'8 8 The Court has framed the issue as "whether the State has
exerted its power in proper proportion to [the taxpayer's] activities
within the State and to [the taxpayer's] consequent enjoyment of the
opportunitiesand protectionswhich the State has afforded' 18 9 or, more
simply, "whether the state has given anything for which it can, ask
90
return."1
These formulations of the fair-relationship-to-services requirement
were couched in terms of "nexus" to the taxing state; commentators
have similarly connected the two requirements.' 91 However, Complete
Auto's articulation of the fair relationship and nexus requirements as
separate elements suggests that they are not identical. 192 The Court
9
has recently stated in JapanLine, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles' 3 that
the fair-relationship-to-services requirement is indeed an independent
1 94
element of the Complete Auto test, requiring separate proof.

Unlike the nexus and discrimination requirements, which merely
address the state's authority to tax, the fair-relationship-to-services requirement limits the amount of the tax. After Complete Auto expressly
removed the barrier to a direct tax on interstate commerce, some
430 U.S. at 279.
text accompanying notes 233-40 infra.
189 General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 441 (1964) (emphasis
added). For other Supreme Court formulations of the fair-relationship-to-services
requirement, see note 240 and text accompanying notes 233-43 infra.
190 Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940) ; cf. Massachusetts
v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 462-63 (1978) :
A governmental body has an obvious interest in making those who
specifically benefit from its services pay the cost and, provided that the
charge is structured to compensate the government for the benefit conferred, there can be no danger of the kind of interference with constitutionally valued activity that the Clauses were designed to prohibit.
Id. at 462-63.
191 To assess the significance of a state's compensatory interest in the
application of its tax to a particular taxpayer, one must determine the
degree to which the taxpayer's activities in interstate commerce benefit
from state government services. And, as a rough but constitutionally
adequate measure of benefits conferred, one must look to the ways in
which the taxed activities can be "connected" with the taxing state.
L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-14, at 346.
192 Complete Auto was followed by a similar formulation of the fair-relationship-to-services requirement as a separate element requiring distinct proof in Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750
(1978).
193 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
194 Id. at 445.
187

188 See
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mechanism was needed to control taxes that were so excessive as to be
confiscatory and barrier-creating, yet had sufficient connection to the
taxing state, were nondiscriminatory, and were not subject to apportionment. That mechanism was the fair-relationship-to-services requirement, adapted from the nexus rationale of the earlier cases and elevated
to an independent element of the current commerce clause test. When
the Court ultimately faces the commerce clause questions raised by
modern resource taxation, it is this requirement that will serve as the
constitutional measuring rod.
IV
HeislerREcONSIDERED

IN THE MODERN CONTEXT

The rigid formalism that characterized early commerce clause cases
first gave way to a balancing of state and federal interests in the state
regulation cases. This section of the Article will demonstrate that the
Court has adopted that same balancing approach in the state taxation
cases and that this development seriously erodes the formalistic underpinnings of the Heisler severance-precedes-commerce analysis. Thus,
Heisler will be of dubious support when state resource severance taxes
come before the modern Court.
Originally, state taxation was shielded from a balancing approach
by the twin notions that (1) states could not tax the conduct of interstate business, 95 and (2) state taxes had to attach to "local incidents"
of business activities. 196 In Complete Auto, the Court overturned the
first of these principles. 197 Applying "a standard of permissibility of
state taxation based on its actual effect rather than its legal terminology," the Court balanced the state's tax against the services the state
provided. 198
Only a year later, in Washington Stevedoring,'9" the Court clearly
demonstrated that the balancing required by Pike in the regulation
cases is essentially the same as the balancing that Complete Auto demands in the taxation cases. Citing Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,2°°
the Court flatly stated that the question of whether a tax burdens com2 01
merce is one that requires a balancing of state and federal interests.
See text accompanying notes 152-54 supra.
196 See text accompanying notes 155-57 supra. By definition, "local incidents"
are those business activities that precede commerce. Id.
197 By implication, Complete Auto also overturned the second principle. See
195

text accompanying notes 212-14 infra.
198 430 U.S. at 281.
199 435 U.S. 734 (1978).
200 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
201 435 U.S. at 748. In Southern Pacific, the competing interests were the

federal interest in unimpeded train travel and the state interest in safety. See
note 109 and text accompanying notes 108-09 supra.

State Severance Taxes

Although the balancing of safety interests [at issue in
Southern Pacific] naturally differs from the balancing of state
financial needs, Complete Auto recognized that a State has a
significant interest in exacting from interstate commerce its
fair share of the cost of state government. All tax burdens do
not impermissibly impede interstate commerce. The Commerce Clause balance tips against the tax only when it unfairly
burdens commerce by202exacting more than a just share from
the interstate activity.
Implicit in this statement is the understanding that the legitimacyof-the-local-interest and the burden-on-commerce elements of the Pike
test merge in the Complete Auto requirement that a tax be fairly related
to services provided by the state.2 0 3 As articulated in Washington Stevedoring, the state regulation and state taxation balancing tests both
measure the same thing: the essential balance between the burden on
20 4
commerce and the local governmental interest served.
The merger of the legal analyses employed in the state regulation and
taxation cases has eroded the policy reasons behind the Heisler holding.
These policy concerns were bound up with the notion that if states were
not allowed to tax the production and manufacturing processes within
their borders, they would be deprived of essential revenues. As articulated by the Court in Coe v. Errol,205 "[i]f such were the rule in
many States there would be nothing but the lands and real estate to
bear the taxes. 20 6 In addition, the Heisler Court felt that a refusal to
allow state taxation of production and manufacturing would be contrary
to principles of federalism because it would withdraw from the states
435 U.S. at 748 (citations omitted).
Similarly, the evenhandedness element of Pike is identical to the nondiscrimination prong of the Complete Auto test. Although the least-intrusivemeans principle of Pike does not match any stated element of Complete Auto, it
speaks to the same trade barrierism issues as the discrimination element of Complete Auto. "Neither the power to tax nor the police power may be used by the
202
203

state of destination with the aim and effect of establishing an economic barrier
against competition with the products of another state or the labor of its residents."
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935).
204 This merger of the two balancing tests is similarly described in the dissenting opinion of Justice Powell in Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
Taking issue with the Court's holding that Iowa's single-factor sales tax formula
did not violate the commerce clause, Justice Powell rooted his dissent in the
notion developed in the regulation cases that "the Commerce Clause constrains us
to view the State's interest in retaining this particular levy as against the constitutional preference for an open economy." Id. at 289 (Powell, J., dissenting).
205 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
206 Id. at 527-28. The Court's concern that the states' tax bases might be eroded
was particularly well founded in an era that predated corporate income tax and
other business-related taxes. Indeed, this concern may resurface if current efforts
at federal budget cutting cause states to lose the revenue-sharing funds on which
local governments have become increasingly dependent.
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essential control of the commercial activities within their borders. 20 T
The Court enunciated the Heisler principle at a time when all or
nothing prevailed. A tax on commerce itself was prohibited by the
commerce clause interpretation of the day,208 so if the Court was to
allow states to tax certain activities, it had to define those activities as
"out of" commerce. 20 9 The Heisler Court announced its severanceprecedes-commerce rule because of its overriding concern that a decision invalidating Pennsylvania's coal severance tax could apply to
defeat not only all severance taxes but all kinds of necessary state business taxes.2 10 It also feared that to define mining as "in" commerce
would "nationalize and withdraw from state jurisdiction" not just coal
21 1
but all the native products of each state.
Although the post-HeislerCourt occasionally indicated that the status
of being "in"commerce should not prevent the states from exacting
some fair measure of taxation, 212 it was not until Complete Auto that
the Court firmly held that interstate commerce did indeed have to pay
its own way. Complete Auto removes the need for the severance-precedes-commerce test of the Heisler trilogy because it allows state taxes
to stand even when they attach to business activities inextricably linked
with interstate commerce. 213 Thus, it shows the way to apply the commerce clause to severance taxation while still allowing important state
taxes to stand. By upholding only nondiscriminatory, fairly apportioned
taxes that have some nexus with the state and are "fairly related to
the services provided by the state," the Complete Auto test obviates the
Heisler Court's chief concern. States can tax interstate commerce, but
they must do so fairly.
Complete Auto also removes the other policy reason for Heisler. Its
See note 58 supra.
E.g., Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925).
209 See text accompanying notes 155-58 supra.
210 See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra.
207
208

211

260 U.S. at 259-60.

See, e.g., Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 165-66
(1954) ("Frequently it has been said that interstate business must pay its way...
and the Court has done more than pay lip service to this idea.").
213 Correlative to the Complete Auto principle that states may tax interstate
commerce is the notion that so long as a tax is reasonably related to the services
provided by the taxing state, there can be no objection that the tax may increase
the price of the product for persons in other states. See Michelin Tire Corp. v.
Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976). In upholding the tax in Michelin Tire against a
challenge under the import-export clause, the Court reasoned:
To be sure, allowance of nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxation may increase the costs of goods purchased by "inland" consumers.
But as already noted, such taxation is the quid pro quo for benefits
actually conferred by the taxing State. There is no reason why local
taxpayers should subsidize the services used by the importer ....
Id. at 288-89.
212
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four-pronged test can be read to protect local control and taxation of
"the fruits of California and the South, the wheat of the West and its
meats, the cotton of the South, the shoes of Massachusetts and the
woolen industries of other States 2 1 4 just as surely as Heislerbut without the rigid formalism that requires the Court to say that while certain
activities are closely linked with commerce, they are not "in" commerce.
Finally, on'e seemingly small point has crept almost unnoticed into
the latest resource isolation cases, which may remove the last remaining
analytical defense of the Heisler trilogy. While Complete Auto has removed the need to define resource severance as "out of" commerce, the
resource isolation cases may have broadened the definition of "commerce" itself to include resource severance. Recently, the Court has
suggested that the definition of "commerce" for purposes of construing
the commerce clause's limitation on state power is the same as its definition for purposes of construing Congress's affirmative power to act
2 15
under the clause.
It is firmly established that Congress can act in a plenary fashion
under the commerce clause. 216 Since NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.,217 it has also been clear that this plenary power is applicable
whenever Congress finds that the regulated activity has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 21 8 It makes no difference to this "substantial economic effect" 219 test whether the activity is "in" or "out of"
the flow of commerce ;220 an activity may have such an effect even if it
is wholly within a state2

21

and even if the activity standing alone would

have no economic effect.2 22 In contrast to this broad interpretation of
the commerce clause's affirmative grant of power, the negative implica214
215

Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. at 259.
See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 n.2 (1979) ; text accompanying

notes 224-27 infra.
216 E.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824).
217301 U.S. 1 (1937).
218 Id. at 41. Such findings need not be formal; a reasonable belief by Congress
that the regulated activity has an economic effect on commerce is sufficient to
support commerce power legislation. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-59 (1964). Congressional power under the
commerce clause is discussed in more detail in the text accompanying notes 254-88
infra.
219 L. TRIBE, supranote 17, § 5-4, at 235-36.
220 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)
(upholding the application of the
Fair Labor Standards Act to all workers who produce goods for interstate commerce). Although National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976),
overruled Wirtz, it did not disavow the commerce clause analysis of Wirtz. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 17, § 5-4, at 236 n.18.
221 E.g., United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
222 So long as many similar acts taken in the aggregate would have a substantial economic effect, each individual act is subject to federal regulation. Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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tion of the clause traditionally has been narrowly construed to prevent
state taxation only when the tax directly affects the flow of commerce.22 3
In Hughes v. Oklahoma,224 however, in an important footnote, the
Court read City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey225 to reject this "two-

tiered definition of commerce. '226 The Hughes Court, without equivocation, stated that "[tihe definition of 'commerce' is the same when
relied on to strike down or restrict state legislation as when relied on to
support some exertion of federal control or regulation. '227 If this recent
dictum survives to become law, the severance-precedes-commerce test
of Heisler will give way to the substantial-economic-effect test of Jones
& Laughlin,228 removing any doubt that state taxation of natural resource severance is now subject to the commerce clause scrutiny of
Complete Auto. Heisler's "in" versus "out of" commerce distinction
229
finally will be extinct.
223

Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc. v. Alabama, 393 U.S. 537 (1969).

224

441 U.S. 322 (1979).

225

437 U.S. 617 (1978).

441 U.S. at 326 n.2. The two-tiered definition of commerce was clearly
articulated in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Whether the subject of the regulation in question was "production,"
"consumption," or "marketing" is, therefore, not material for purposes
of deciding the question of federal power before us. That an activity is
of local character .... might help in determining whether in the absence
of Congressional action it would be permissible for the state to exert its
power on the subject matter, even though in so doing it to some degree
affected interstate commerce. But even if appellee's activity be local and
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect
on interstate commerce ....
Id. at 124-25. In Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977), Justice
Marshall, writing for the Court, stated: "But these statements [that certain
activities precede the flow of commerce] were made in upholding the rights of
States to tax what was argued to be interstate commerce. Pronouncements made
in that context are not used interchangeably as statements of law where the issue
is the power of Congress to regulate under the Commerce Clause." Id. at 282 n.17.
227 441 U.S. at 326 n.2.
228 The plaintiffs in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State, No. 42657 (Mont.
1st Jud. Dist. July 27, 1979), aff'd, 37 Mont. St. Rep. 1192, 615 P.2d 847, prob.
juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 607 (1980) (No. 80-581), unsuccessfully argued that the
definition of commerce applicable to the negative implication of the commerce
power should be the Jones & Laughlin test. Id. at 17.
229 This result may be inevitable in part because, as our society becomes more
complex, it becomes more difficult to draw reasoned distinctions between which
activities are in commerce and which are not. For example, the Court had difficulty distinguishing between the generation and transmission of electricity in
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932). Similarly, in MichiganWisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954), the Court's reasoning
that the tax at issue went beyond production and attached to the transmission of
natural gas was less than persuasive.
226
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The decision in Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead23 0 illustrates
the potential impact of the Hughes footnote. In Utah Power & Light
Co. v. PJost,13 ' the Supreme Court had held that the generation of
electricity was not in commerce; therefore, a state tax on electricity
generation was beyond commerce clause scrutiny. Congress later passed
a statute that prohibited states from taxing the generation or transmission of electricity in a manner that discriminated against out-of-state
consumers. 23 2 In Arizona Public Service, New Mexico sought to evade
the statute, relying on Utah Power & Light to argue that its tax on
electricity generation was beyond the scope of Congress's power under
the commerce clause. The Supreme Court rejected New Mexico's argument and found that Congress had plenary power under the commerce
clause to prohibit state taxation of electricity generation. If, as the
Hughes footnote suggests, the definition of commerce articulated in
Arizona Public Service applies to state impediments to commerce as
well as to the affirmative exercise of the federal commerce power, then
Arizona Public Service sub silentio overrules the Utah Power & Light
holding that the generation of electricity precedes commerce. Such
a result would complete the erosion of the analytical base on which
Heisler stands.
V
FAIR RELATIONSHIP TO COST AND BENEFIT: THE NEW BATTLEGROUND

With the demise of the Heisler trilogy, the essential inquiry in resource taxation cases will shift from whether the activity taxed precedes
commerce to whether the tax is "fairly related to the services provided
by the State. ' 2 3 3 This fair-relationship-to-services element of the Com23

U.S. 141 (1979).
286 U.S. 165 (1932).

232

Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2121 (a), 90 Stat. 1914

230 441

(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1976)).
233 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 279. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully raised the argument that Complete Auto's fair-relationship-to-services requirement now governs resource severance taxation in Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. State, 37 Mont. St. Rep. 1192, 1201, 615 P.2d 847, 855, prob. juris. noted,
101 S.Ct. 607 (1980) (No. 80-581).
The court in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F2d 537 (10th Cir.), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 71 (1980) (No. 80-11), while upholding a tribal severance tax
partly because of a Heisler finding that the tax attached to a local activity, expressly recognized that a close connection with interstate commerce would trigger
the Complete Auto test. The court went on to note:
We need not decide whether a severance tax measured by quantity
produced within a single jurisdiction falls within the ambit of this new
doctrine.... [But if the] Stevedoring and Complete Auto Transit analy-

sis applied, the only question is whether the tax is fairly related to
services provided by the reservation.

Id. at 545 n.4.
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plete Auto test is not an entirely new development in commerce clause
law; its roots are planted firmly in the due process principles of the
234
early nexus cases.
The nexus cases require an inquiry into whether there is a sufficient
relationship between the industry taxed and the state to justify imposing the tax. When confronted with a due process claim against a state
tax, the Court in the nexus cases has scrutinized the benefits and protections that the state affords the industry and the costs that the industry's presence imposes on the state. A finding of benefits to the industry
or costs to the state has invariably proved sufficient to defeat the due
process claim.
Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 235 a hallmark nexus case, formulated
the essential question as "whether the state has given anything for
' 2
which it can ask return." '

6

23
Similarly, the Court in Freemanv. Hewit

described a justifiable state tax on commerce as one "designed to make
such commerce bear a fair share of the cost of the local government
whose protection it enjoys.

' 238

The test was alternatively stated in

Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone 239 as allowing taxes that provide
"compensation for the protection and advantagesrendered to commerce
by state governments.

'24 0

While Complete Auto is the first case to elevate the fair-relationshipto-services requirement to independent status, I. C. Penney from the
nexus context affords insight into the substance of the requirement.
A state is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed
by the Constitution, if by the practical operation of a tax the
state has exerted its power in relation to opportunities which
it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits
which it241
has conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized
society.
Most recently, in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 242 the
Court elaborated that the "opportunities," "protections," and "benefits"
contemplated by the fair-relationship-to-services requirement "include
not only police and fire protection, but the benefits of a trained work
See text accompanying notes 171-73 supra.
235 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
236 Id. at 444 (emphasis added).
237 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
238 Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
239 335 U.S. 80 (1948).
240 Id. at 85 (emphasis added). The nexus test was quoted with approval in
Colonial Pipeline, Inc. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975), which stated the question
as whether "the State has provided benefits and protections for those activities
for which it is justified in asking a fair and reasonable return." Id. at 108.
241 311 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added). See also note 190 supra.
242 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
234
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243
force and the advantages of a civilized society.
The extraction of natural resources imposes on a state three categories of costs that should fall within the ambit of "services provided
by the state" articulated in Complete Auto.2 4 4 First, extractive activities usually impose certain direct costs on governmental units within
the state. These direct costs include the monitoring and regulation of
airsheds, watersheds, groundwater aquifers, solid waste disposal, and
other environmental features commonly disturbed by extractive activity. They may also include the construction of special roads and other
public facilities that do not serve the general public and thus require
special funding. Although the exact boundary between special public
facilities and those serving the general public may be hazy, the problem
is one of degree and is therefore properly subject to legislative definition.
Even with extensive regulation and monitoring of the environmental
effects of extractive activities, however, there may remain significant
damage to public health and well-being. For example, a mine located in
an area of high aesthetic quality may cause a significant loss of aesthetic
benefits during the lifespan of the mine and even well beyond it. Although such aesthetic damages may not be readily measured, the large
amounts of time and resources that environmentally oriented citizens
spend in attempts to reduce or eliminate them reveal their significance.
Thus, a second aspect of resource taxation is to ensure compensation
for those public damages that environmental regulation and monitoring
do not eliminate.
Recompense for the first two categories of costs to the state clearly
meets the fair-relationship-to-services requirement. Special roads and
other state services to the individuals and firms engaged in resource
extraction are literally "services provided by the state" within the
meaning of Complete Auto. Furthermore, in Arizona Public Service
Co. v. Snead, the Court made it clear that states may collect taxes to pay
for the costs associated with "environmental and other problems" caused
by the generation of electricity. 245 Therefore, the fair-relationship-toservices requirement of Complete Auto must contemplate compensation for the environmental regulation and monitoring and environmental damage associated with the presence of the industry.
The third basis for recompense to the state is the resource extraction
itself, rather than its environmental and other side effects. Each of the
resources on which the taxes are levied is finite and nonrenewable. As
243

Id. at 445.

See generally Note, supra note 5.
"The generation of electricity in the Four Corners region undoubtedly also
generates environmental and other problems for New Mexico. There is no indication that Congress intended to prevent the state from taxing the generation of
electricity to pay for solutions to these problems." 441 U.S. 141, 150-51 (emphasis
244

245

added).
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a consequence, the state faces the inevitable depletion of these assets
and a subsequent contraction in the state's economy if a sustainable
economic base cannot be developed to replace the depleted wealth.246
Even more concretely, state government and other governmental units
within the state face the inevitable prospect of a decline in the revenues
247
available to support public services as the taxable resource disappears.
This third category of costs to the state may fall within the "opportunities" and "benefits" contemplated by I. C. Penney 4s and Japan
Line ;249 however, quantification becomes a major difficulty. 25 0 Under
the modern balancing test mandated by Complete Auto, the amount of,

as well as the reason for, the tax must be fairly related to the services
provided. Thus, courts must determine whether the amount of costs
the state claims to have incurred is reasonable. The reasonableness of
resource replacement costs is more difficult to determine than that of
the direct costs of state services referred to in Japan Line and the envi246 ,,
'You can't expect a state to take the environmental risks, lose a nonrenewable resource and not cover its costs,' says Kent Conrad, an aide to Mr. Dorgan
[North Dakota tax commissioner]. 'If we can't break even, we'll stop development.'" Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1980, at 14, col. 2.
247 "Do they really want Montana to become another Appalachia?" asks
Wally McRae, a cattle rancher who lives near the town of Colstrip
(pop. 1,900). "People are attacking us for doing something we think is
responsible. We're sliding along now on a great bubble, but it will burst
somewhere down the road. Coal-based economies always go to hell.
We're trying to avoid the boom-bust cycle."
Id. col. 1.
248 311 U.S. at 444; see text accompanying note 241 supra.
249 441 U.S. at 445; see text accompanying note 243 supra.
250 On the other hand, precise mathematical measurement is not required in
weighing the amount of tax against the services provided. In a concurring opinion
in Washington Stevedoring, Justice Powell stated:
[T]he Court observes that "nothing in the record suggests that the tax
is not fairly related to services and protection provided by the State."
Since the stevedoring companies undoubtedly avail themselves of police
and fire protection, as well as other benefits Washington offers its local
businesses, this statement cannot be questioned.
435 U.S. at 764 (citation omitted). A similar view was expressed by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion in Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S.
429,447 (1978).
Similarly, in the tax apportionment cases, the Court has been reluctant to
second-guess state legislative judgments setting the amounts of tax levies. The
Court has consistently held that the commerce clause "does not call for mathematical exactness nor for the rigid application of a particular formula; only if
the resulting valuation is palpably excessive will it be set aside." Japan Line, Ltd.
v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. at 455 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 325 (1943) (Stone, C.J., dissenting)). See Hellerstein,
State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause: An HistoricalPerspective, 29 VAND.
L. REV. 335, 347 (1976).
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ronmertal and other externality costs referred to in Arizona Public
25 1

Service.

Unfortunately, the Court has not yet provided an adequate standard
for measuring costs to the state and determining whether a tax is excessive in relation to those costs. Although the "benefits" and "opportunities" language that the Court has adopted from the nexus cases
may be a sufficient basis for applying the nexus test, which requires
only minimum contacts, it is not helpful in applying the fair-relationship-to-services element of Complete Auto. The precise definition of
the opportunities, benefits, and services that may be included in the fair
relationship equation and how those factors must be measured and
weighed will require further clarification through judicial resolution
of future cases. 25 2 However it is ultimately defined, the fair-relationship-to-services requirement promises to be the determinative factor in
2
future resource severance taxation cases. 5
251 It is interesting to note that when Congress legislates under the commerce
clause, the Court gives great deference to the reasonableness of congressional
findings that the regulated activity affects commerce. See Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). If the Court accorded a similar
deference to state legislative findings, the difficulty of determining the reasonableness of replacement costs would be greatly diminished. Cf. Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (in reviewing a legislative classification
attacked as denying equal protection, the Court will assume the existence, at the
time the law was enacted, of any reasonably conceivable state of facts that would
support the classification).
252 How the federal and state interests should be characterized and weighed in
the fair-relationship-to-services equation depends a great deal on who is speaking.
Representatives of the energy-rich states focus on the need for the tax to avoid
the boom-bust cycle and to pay for severe environmental costs, other externality
costs imposed by the industry, and the loss of a nonrenewable resource. On the
other hand, representatives of consuming states, where higher fuel prices are in
part attributable to increased severance taxes, expound the various federal interests: the policies of free trade and open economy that underlie the commerce
clause, see text accompanying notes 18-25 supra, the need to prevent profiteering
by resource-rich states at the expense of consuming states, see note 26 supra,
and the conflict between higher extractive taxes and national energy policy during
the current energy crisis. See note 259 infra.
While the federal and state interests can easily be postulated in the extreme,
the resolution of any given case will require a delicate weighing of the reasonable
costs incurred by the state against the quantum of those costs that can be fairly
borne by the interstate market. Striking that balance will be the subject of a
subsequent article by the authors. See note 253 infra.
253 Several issues arise when the fair-relationship-to-services element of Complete Auto is viewed as the central standard against which the amount of a tax
is to be judged. The most critical of these issues are the following:
(1) What kinds of costs to the state justify imposing a resource
tax?
(2) How may a state legitimately measure those costs?
(3) What standard of review should courts apply to state legisla-
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VI
THE SPECTER OF CONGRESSIONAL PREEMPTION

This Article thus far has focused on the negative implication of the
commerce clause, which operates through the force of judicial opinions
to restrain state regulation of commerce in the absence of congressional
action. However, as national energy problems grow more complex and
require greater federal involvement, it becomes more likely that Congress will exercise its affirmative commerce power to preempt state
resource taxes. 254 Rooted in the supremacy of federal law, 255 the doctrine of preemption precludes state power to act when (1) the state
action conflicts with federal law or (2) a federal legislative scheme is
25 6
meant to occupy the field.
A.

Conflict Preemption

Conflicts between state and federal law can be either direct or indirect.
Indirect conflict occurs when the state law frustrates the policies and
objectives of the federal law. 257 The preemption test in these circumstances requires an in-depth exploration of the entire federal statutory
25 s
scheme to determine whether the state law significantly impedes it.
Thus, if it can be demonstrated that there is a clear federal policy to
encourage production of particular energy-producing resources and
that a particular state tax or regulation would undermine that federal
259
policy, then the preemption doctrine will come into play.
tive

determinations of the amount of those costs?
(4) To what extent is the state's decisionmaking process relevant
to the result reached?
These and other aspects of the fair-relationship-to-services standard, only touched
upon here, will be explored in a later article by the authors.
254 See generally Note, The Increasing Conflict Between State Coal Severance Taxation and Federal Energy Policy, 57 TEx. L. REv. 675, 689-90, 693-94
(1979) ; Note, supranote 5, at 354-57, 361-63 (1980).
255 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
256 L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-23, at 377. See generally Note, Pre-emnption as
a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208
(1959).
257 See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973) (local control of take-off hours conflicts with the objectives of the Federal
Aeronautics Act) ; Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967) (state
law denying unemployment benefits to persons unemployed because of labor
disputes frustrates enforcement of National Labor Relations Act).
258 If the state law merely supplements and does not undermine federal efforts,
the Court will allow it to stand. See, e.g., Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n
v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
259 A state tax on resources mined on federal land under federal leases raises
special preemption problems under the property clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3,
cl. 2, that are not presented when the resources are mined on private or state
land. Arguably, under Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976), any state
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Cases of direct conflict present more clear-cut examples of preemption, 260 but even they require some degree of statutory interpretation.
Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead261 is a classic illustration of the
kind of statutory interpretation used to determine whether a direct
conflict exists. In Arizona Public Service, New Mexico argued that
the federal act did no more than prohibit state taxes that would be
invalid under the negative implication of the commerce clause. 26 Because New Mexico's tax on electrical energy arguably did not violate
the commerce clause, 2 3 the state would have had the Court conclude
that the tax did not conflict with the federal act. The Court, however,
after a thorough review of the federal statute and its legislative history,
found that it was not merely coextensive with the commerce clause.
tax that frustrates the policy of a federal law enacted under the property clause
violates the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
Indeed, the coal companies in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State, 37 Mont. St.
Rep. 1192, 615 P.2d 847, prob. juris, noted, 101 S. Ct. 607 (1980) (No. 80-581),
have argued that the legislative history behind the federal statutory scheme for
issuing leases for mining coal on federal lands answers the question of who should
get the "economic rents" that necessarily flow from the extraction of the coal.
They contend that Congress decided that the federal government should get those
rents through its coal leases. For agreeing to this compromise, the states would
get a share of all federal royalties. Therefore, the argument goes, the federal
statutory scheme precludes state taxation of coal mined under federal leases. See
Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-377, § 9, 90 Stat.
1090 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1976)). The Montana Supreme Court, 37 Mont.
St. Rep. at 1211, 615 P.2d at 862, rejected this argument, citing the provision of
the Mineral Lands Leasing Act that
[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed or held to affect the rights
of the States or other local authority to exercise any rights which they
may have, including the right to levy and collect taxes upon improvements, output of mines, or other rights, property, or assets of any lessee
of the United States.
30 U.S.C. § 189 (1976). The Montana court also relied on the United States
Supreme Court decision in Mid-Northern Co. v. Montana, 268 U.S. 45 (1925),
which had interpreted this provision to allow a one percent state levy on the gross
value of oil produced in Montana. 37 Mont. St. Rep. at 1211-12, 615 P.2d at 862-63.
In addition to the policy behind the federal coal leasing scheme, the plaintiff
companies invoked a federal policy (developed from a number of statutes) to encourage the development of federal coal. Id. at 1207, 615 P.2d at 859. Needless to
say, if such a policy could be shown to be substantially frustrated by the Montana
tax, preemption considerations would loom large. The Montana Supreme Court
did not reach this issue, however, because it failed to discern any federal policy
to encourage the development of western coal. See id. at 1208-09, 615 P.2d at
860-61.
260 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963).
261 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
262 Id. at 149.
263 See Note, supra note 5, at 347-54.
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"[T] he provision clearly operates, we think, to carry out the expressed
26 4
intent of the Senate to invalidate the New Mexico tax. 1
The Court's careful scrutiny of the federal statute in Arizona Public
Service illustrates what Professor Tribe calls the "clear statement
requirement," a corollary to the conflict preemption doctrine. In a series
of cases striking down the extension of federal criminal jurisdiction
under the commerce clause, 265 Professor Tribe finds the principle that
"unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to
have significantly changed the federal-state balance. ' 26 6 This clear
statement requirement, argues Professor Tribe, can have the effect of
limiting a given exercise of congressional commerce power when neither
the statutory language nor the legislative history clearly states an intent
2 67
to preempt the state law in question.
In Arizona Public Service, the Court found in the legislative history a
clear congressional consensus to void the New Mexico tax on electrical
energy.2 68 Such a consensus, however, may be difficult to achieve for
other kinds of resource taxation. 269 For example, the recent congressional debate over increased coal severance tax rates in the western
states 270 suggests that even if Congress attempted to limit coal sever264

441 U.S. at 149.

United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973); United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336 (1971) ; Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971) ; United States
v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953) (plurality opinion) (Jackson, J.);
see L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 5-8, at 243 n.3.
266 L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 5-8, at 243 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
267 Id. § 5-8. The clear statement requirement is derived from cases construing
statutes that use commerce clause authority to control noneconomic conduct. See
cases cited in note 265 supra. Arguably, it is less applicable to congressional action
aimed directly at controlling commercial matters.
268 Although the statute on its face was ambiguous, the Court found that the
Senate floor debate was explicit. 441 U.S. at 148 (citing 122 CONG. REC. 24,324-29
(1976)). Additionally, the bill was amended specifically "to allay the concerns of
Senators from States with [taxes] somewhat similar" to New Mexico's. Id. at 148.
The concurring justices in Arizona Public Service did not agree that the legislative history clearly evidenced a preemptive intent. Nevertheless, they felt constrained to presume that the federal law went beyond the negative implications of
the commerce clause.
[Ilt may be unrealistic to assume automatically that Congress never
passes a "sterile" law, in the sense that the provision does no more
than the Constitution would have done had Congress never enacted the
law. But, in my view, the laws enacted by Congress certainly are entitled to a presumption to that effect.
Id. at 151-52 (Rehnquist & White, JJ., concurring).
269 Perhaps a clear legislative statement was possible in Arizona Public Service because the statute singled out the New Mexico tax and thus permitted a
coalition of all against one. See note 268 supra.
270 There are at least two bills before Congress that seek to limit resource
265
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ance taxation, the differing interests within any coalition formed to
adopt such legislation would prevent it from expressing a clear congressional purpose. In that event, the clear statement principle could operate to preclude effective federal legislative intervention.
B. Occupation-of-the-FieldPreemption
Occupation-of-the-field preemption is less likely than conflict preemption to invalidate state resource taxes. This kind of preemption occurs only when Congress has clearly declared an intent to exercise
exclusive control over the subject matter, or when the nature of the
regulated subject matter mandates an inference that Congress so intended. 2 7 1 The requirement of clear congressional intent to occupy the
field will be particularly adhered to when the field is one in which the
2
states historically have operated.

27

Because resource taxation is an area historically left to exclusive state
control, it is unlikely to be occupied by federal law. 273 An exception to

this general observation, however, is the taxation of nuclear power re-

274
sources, an area replete with potentially preemptive federal law.

With its national defense overtones, the field of nuclear power arguably
requires exclusive federal control. Indeed, the Atomic Energy Act has
been read to provide for exclusive federal regulation of radiation hazards and thus to preempt state nuclear waste laws. 275 If federal occupation of the nuclear field encompasses the waste disposal at the end of the
nuclear cycle, its extension to uranium mining at the beginning of the
2 76
cycle is not without logic.

severance taxes to 12.5%. Those bills are a direct response to Montana's 30%
severance tax on coal. Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1980, at 14, col. 1. In the current
congressional debate over increased coal severance taxes, there is at least some
recognition that a federally mandated ceiling on severance taxes would implicate
the production and processing taxes of other states. As Montana Senator Max
Baucus noted in his testimony before the House Commerce and Energy subcommittee: "If you want your state's taxes limited by Congress, then go ahead and
pass this bill. It will be the opening shot of the war between the states." Albuquerque J., Mar. 29, 1980, § B, at 1.
271 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). If
the Court finds that Congress intended to occupy the field, then no state regulation
of the field will be tolerated "no matter how well [it] comport[s] with substantive federal policies." L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-25, at 384.
272 "[Tlhe historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
273 For example, in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Congress was careful
to protect state severance taxation from control by the pricing provisions of the
law. See Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, § 110, 15 U.S.C. § 3320 (Supp. III 1979).
274 See, e.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2282 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979).
275 Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971),
aff'dmen., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
276 If state taxation or control of uranium mining were to severely hamper
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C. Limits of the Preemptive Power of Congress
As the specter of congressional preemption of state resource taxes
looms larger, the states may turn to the recently revitalized notion that
state sovereignty provides an inherent limitation on the exercise of
congressional power under the commerce clause. In National League
of Cities v. Usery,2 17 that rationale was, for the first time since the New

Deal, applied to limit the congressional commerce power.2 78 The Court
in National League of Cities drew upon the principle of dual sovereignty, 279 as well as the tenth amendment doctrine of reserved states'
rights,2 8 0 to hold that Congress could not use its commerce clause aunuclear power production and consequently lead to the enactment of federal
statutes, direct conflict preemption could even come into play.
277
278

426 U.S. 833 (1976).
A number of earlier cases had relied on state sovereignty to limit other con-

stitutional powers of Congress. See, e.g., Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 419
(1938) (federal taxing power does not extend to those activities "indispensable
to the maintenance of a state government") (dictum) ; Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S.
559 (1911) (power to admit new states does not authorize Congress to tell a
state where to locate its capital).
National League of Cities, however, is the only case since the 1937 shift in the
Court to invalidate an act of Congress on commerce clause grounds. Between
the turn of the century and 1937, the Supreme Court struck down eight federal
acts as exceeding the limits of the commerce power. Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Bituminous Coal Conservation Act); Schecter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (National Recovery Act) ; Railroad
Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (Railroad Pension and Retirement Act) ; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (child labor laws) ;
Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909) (act making it a felony to harbor
alien prostitutes) ; Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (act making it a
crime to discharge employee for membership in a union) ; The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908) (Employers' Liability Act) ; In re Heff, 197
U.S. 488 (1905) (act prohibiting sale of liquor to Indians).
The doctrinal shift that occurred in 1937 is explained in Stein, The Commerce
Clause and the National Economy, 59 HARV. L. Rav. 645 (1946). See also note 47
supra.
279 426 U.S. at 852. The principle of dual sovereignty developed during the
period from Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), until enactment of
the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379
(current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10,101-11,916 (Supp. III 1979)). During this
period, the Supreme Court rarely reviewed federal action under the commerce
clause, L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 5-4, at 233, and its decisions dealing with the
limits of the clause "reflect inconsistent doctrinal themes." Id. at 233 n.6. Some of
the pre-1887 decisions, however, do articulate a principle of dual sovereignty that
provides some external limitation on the congressional commerce power. See, e.g.,
United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41, 43-44 (1870) (the federal commerce power "has always been understood ...as a virtual denial of any power to
interfere with the internal trade and business of the separate States").
280 426 U.S. at 842-43. The tenth amendment rationale of National League of
Cities was further developed in Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n
v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va.), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980)

State Severance Taxes

thority to extend federal wage and hour laws to state employees. 2 s'
Although the Court acknowledged that the wage and hour laws were
"undoubtedly within the scope of the Commerce Clause, ' 28 2 it found
that the application of those laws to state employees would so encroach
on the states' decisions about how to allocate their financial resources
and provide services to their citizens that it would "impermissibly in'28 3
terfere with [their] integral governmental functions.
The Court's broad language in National League of Cities provides a
strong argument against federal preemption of state severance taxes.
Many of the resource-producing states depend heavily on severance
taxation to fund their essential governmental activities. Arguably, a
(Nos. 79-1538 & 79-1596). There, the court acknowledged that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III
1979), was within the scope of the commerce power, but struck it down as transcending the constitutional barrier imposed by the tenth amendment.
Relying on National League of Cities, the court drew a distinction between the
use of the commerce power to regulate private activity and its use to regulate the
states as states. 483 F.Supp. at 432. The Court invalidated the Act because it found
that there is a significant impact on the governmental bodies involved:
through forced relinquishment of state control of land use planning;
through loss of state control of its economy; and through economic
harm, from the expenditure of state funds to implement the act and
from destruction of the taxing power of certain counties, cities, and
towns.
Id. at 435. The case is now on appeal and, if affirmed, could bolster states' tenth
amendment arguments against any congressionally imposed limitation on their
severance taxes. See also Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Ind.), prob.
juris, noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231).
281 "We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly
displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress
by Art. I, § 8, cl.3." 426 U.S. at 852.
282 Id.at 841.
283 Id. at 851. National League of Cities explicitly states that when a federal
action "impairs the States' integrity," id. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States,
421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1974)), forces "relinquishment of important governmental
activities," id. at 847, "interfere[s] with traditional aspects of state sovereignty,"
id. at 849, or "force[s] directly upon the States [federal] choices as to how
essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral government functions are to
be made," id. at 855, that action impermissibly violates the principles of federalism
and the tenth amendment.
In a ringing dissent, Justice Brennan viewed the opinion as a repudiation of
the fundamental principle "that the Constitution contemplates that restraints
upon exercise by Congress of its plenary commerce power lie in the political
process and not in the judicial process." Id. at 857. Even Justice Blackmun, while
concurring in the judgment, indicated his difficulty with the broad implications of
the opinion. He read the opinion, however, as adopting "a balancing approach,
[which] does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection,
where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential." Id. at 856.
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federally imposed ceiling on severance taxes would impair those states'
fiscal integrity and "force [a] relinquishment of important governmental activities ' 2 4 far more than the minimum wage requirements
28 5
struck down in National League of Cities.
Thus far, however, National League of Cities has done nothing to

upset the balance of federal-state power in commerce clause adjudication.2 8 6 The Court's failure to develop the principles of National League
of Cities in subsequent state taxation cases may undercut its viability.
Although Complete Auto Transit and Washington Stevedoring both

upheld state taxes against commerce clause challenges, 28 7 the Court
failed even to consider the principles of state sovereignty it had articulated in National League of Cities. Instead, it announced a balancing
principle for weighing state tax schemes against the burdens they impose on commerce. Thus, National League of Cities notwithstanding,
if Congress makes a judgment that severance taxes above a certain level
unreasonably interfere with interstate commerce and clearly states its
intent to invalidate those taxes, the Court almost surely will give effect
to the congressional action.

28 8

Id. at 847.
See Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Ind.), prob. ]uris. noted, 101
S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231) ; Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n
v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va.), prob. juris, noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980)
(Nos. 79-1538 & 79-1596).
286 See, e.g., Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979). National
League of Cities was virtually ignored in Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S.
444 (1978), which upheld a federal tax on all civil aircraft as applied to stateowned helicopters used for police functions. See id. at 456 & n.13.
The National League of Cities argument has been raised, however, in an action
by gas-producing states to strike down various provisions of the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. III 1979). See Oklahoma v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 494 F. Supp. 636 (W.D. Okla. 1980). Quoting from National League of Cities, plaintiffs alleged that the Act "'force[si directly upon the States its federal choices as to how the essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be made and impair[s]
the States' ability to function effectively within the federal system.' " Complaint
at 7-8 (quoting 426 U.S. at 855). The court rejected this argument because (1) it
did not feel that the power to tax gas produced and sold intrastate was the type of
integral governmental function that National League of Cities was referring to,
and (2) the plaintiffs had failed to make a sufficient factual showing of the Act's
financial impact on the state's ability to structure its integral governmental operations. 494 F. Supp. at 656-57.
287 See text accompanying notes 163-70 supra.
The Court in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980), relied in part on
National League of Cities considerations in upholding a state preference to in-state
purchasers of state-owned cement. See id. at 438-39. The dissent in Reeves would
rely on National League of Cities only as authority for "the power of [state] governments to supply their own needs" as opposed to state participation in "the private market ... for the advantage of its private citizens." Id. at 450 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
288 If Congress seeks to eliminate all severance taxes, however, it will cripple
284

285
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CONCLUSION

The formalistic delineation of the commerce clause in the pre-New
Deal era gave way to the modern balancing approach largely because
the earlier formalism did not adequately resolve the more difficult commerce clause questions created by the growing complexities of modern
society. The irrelevance of the Heisler severance-precedes-commerce
analysis to the modern problems that surround our national energy
policy is a classic example of the failure of the old devices. Issues that
were well settled on the legitimate-state-control side of the ledger in
the 1920's have shifted to the national-interest side of the ledger today.
As energy development assumes greater national importance, state
resource taxes will come under closer commerce clause scrutiny. Because of the national importance of domestic energy development, state
resource taxation should no longer be protected from commerce clause
scrutiny by the severance-precedes-commerce formula. If the tax on the
privilege of doing interstate business examined in Complete Auto and
the tax on stevedoring at issue in Washington Stevedoring must be
"fairly related to the services provided by the State, ' 28 9 then taxes on
the extractive process should meet the same standard.
the self-governing ability of states that depend heavily on those taxes, and National League of Cities will certainly come into play to preclude such a law.
289 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 279.

